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I. INTRODUCTON
In the United States, employment is presumed to be at will' unless a
contract, such as a collective bargaining agreement, specifies that the em-
ployment will be terminated only for just cause.2 An at-will employee
can be terminated for any reason, or for no reason at all.' Although
most public employees and unionized employees can only be terminated
for cause, an estimated seventy to seventy-five percent of employees in
the United States are employed at will.4 It is estimated that 2 million
nonprobationary, nonunion, noncivil-service employees are discharged
each year, and that 150,000 to 200,000 of them would have legitimate
claims under a just cause standard.5
Critics of the at-will rule have argued since the late 1960s that the
rule should be abandoned and replaced by a just cause standard for em-
ployment termination. While they have welcomed common-law inroads
made against the at-will rule during the last twenty years, most critics
1. In California the presumption that employment is at will is codified at Labor Code
§ 2922. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989).
2. Just cause (sometimes called good cause) is a flexible concept that takes into account
relevant circumstances, legitimate business needs, and principles of progressive discipline,
among other factors, in determining whether an employer had legitimate reasons to terminate
an employee in a given case. Labor arbitrators have developed its meaning in the practice of
labor arbitration. See generally A.M. KOVEN & S.L. SMITH, JuST CAUSE: THE SEVEN TEsrs
(1985); McPherson, The Evolving Concept of Just Cause: Carroll R. Dougherty and the Re.
quirement of Disciplinary Due Process, 38 LAB. L.J. 387 (1987).
The Drafting Committee of the Commission on Uniform State Laws, in its Draft Uniform
Employment-Termination (see infra notes 49-61 and accompanying text), uses the term "good
cause" synonymously with "just cause." In this note, the two terms are also used interchange-
ably. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Draft Uniform Em-
ployment-Termination Act, 540 Individual Empl. Rts. Man. (BNA) 21, 23 (1990) [hereinafter
Uniform Act].
3. On the origins and history of the American at-will rule, see Mauk, Wrongful Dis.
charge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege, 21 IDAHo L. REV. 201, 202-07 (1985);
Feinman, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118
(1976).
The rule was essentially invented in the late nineteenth century, during the heyday of
laissez-faire capitalism. It purports to be consistent with the at-will theory of contract, but as
Feinman pointed out, if it were, "the agreement established by the parties would have been
enforced. Thus the duration of hiring and the notice required would have been open questions
in each case to be decided without presumptions of... termination at will .... IT]he contract
approach was never implemented because of the rise of employment at will." Feinman, supra,
at 125.
In recent years courts have applied contract principles to employment contracts, making
it possible for employees to overcome the presumption that employment is at will. See, e.g.,
Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
4. Mauk, supra note 3, at 204.
5. Uniform Act, supra note 2, at 23.
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have argued that these common-law developments remain too limited
and that state or federal legislation is needed to provide adequate protec-
tion.6 The United States is the only major industrialized nation that has
not enacted legislation to protect employees' interest in security of em-
ployment in accord with international standards.' Legislation in the
United States has, however, increasingly limited the managerial preroga-
tive to terminate employment, in order to protect the interests of employ-
ees and of the public.8 Statutory employment protection is consistent
with this trend as well as with international standards. The at-will rule
seems increasingly anachronistic in light of these developments. It ig-
nores employees' legitimate interests in employment security and in fair
treatment when termination is necessary.
In the case of public employees, the courts have recognized these
interests in the form of property or liberty interests. 9 When a public em-
ployee has such a property interest in employment, 10 the employee can-
not be terminated without due process." In Cleveland Board of
6. See, e.g., Blades, Employment at Will vs Individual Freedom On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. Rrv. 1404 (1967); Summers, Individual Protection
Against Unjust Discharge." Time for a Statute 62 VA. L REv. 481 (1976); Note, Protecting At
11i Employees Against Wrongful Discharge The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980); Individual Rights in the Workplace the Employment-at-Will Is-
sue, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. (1983) (spec. issue, No. 2); Gould, Stemming the Wrongful Dis-
charge Tide A Case for Arbitration, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 404 (1987); Employment Rights
Symposium, 67 NEB. L. REv. 1 (1988); STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, To STRIKE A NEW
BALANCE: AD Hoc COMMITIEE ON TERMINATION AT WILL AND WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
(1984) [hereinafter GOULD REPORT]; Minda & Raab, Time for an Unjust Dismissal Statute in
New York, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1137 (1989); Grodin, Toward a Wrongful Termination
Statute for California, 42 HAsTINGs L. 135 (1990).
7. See GOULD REPORT, supra note 6; Summers, supra note 6. See also Gould, Job Secur-
ity in the United States Some Reflections on Unfair Dismissal and Plant Closure Legislation
from a Comparative Perspective 67 NEB. L. REv. 28 (1988). In many countries, legislation
aims to minimize overall unemployment as well as to afford protection to individual
employees.
8. Federal legislation limiting managerial discretion in order to protect employees and
the public includes Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1988); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988); Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988); Whistleblower Protec-
tion Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.
(1990)); and Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 29 U.S.C. § 706 (1990), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (1990).
9. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593
(1972); Matthews v. Harney County, Or., School Dist. No. 4, 819 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1987).
10. Whether the employee has a property interest depends on state law, Le., whether the
employee is a nonprobationary employee in ajob classified by the state as one to which security
of employment attaches. Roth, 408 U.S. at 564; Dorr v. County of Butte, 795 F.2d 875 (9th
Cir. 1986).
11. See cases cited supra notes 9-10.
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Education v. Loudermill, 12 the U.S. Supreme Cou:rt held that in the pub-
lic employment context, due process requires, at a minimum, notice of
the charges against the employee, an explanation of the employer's evi-
dence, and a meaningful opportunity for the employee to respond before
the termination is carried out.13 If the court determines that a property
or liberty interest is implicated,14 it must determine on a case-by-case
basis what pretermination process is due.15 An employee's liberty inter-
est, or interest in preserving a good reputation, may require a name clear-
ing hearing even when there is no property interest. 16
Private employees' interests in continuing employment are enforcea-
ble only if there is a contractual basis for them. A statutory just cause
standard would protect the interests of private employees who do not
have a contractual right to be terminated only for cause.
In the absence of statutory reform, the courts have chipped away at
the at-will rule for the last twenty years in an effort to provide a remedy
12. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
13. The court held:
The essential requirements of due process... are notice and an opportunity to re-
spond. The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why pro-
posed action should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement (citation
omitted). The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the
charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity
to present his side of the story [before termination].
Id. at 546.
14. An employee has a constitutionally protected property interest in his or her job if that
employee has a reasonable expectation or a "legitimate claim of entitlement" rather than
merely a "unilateral expectation" of continued employment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972). A liberty interest is implicated if the charge underlying the termination
"impairs a reputation for honesty or morality." Matthews v. Harney County, Or., School
Dist. No. 4, 819 F.2d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 1987).
15. See generally I. SILVER, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DISCHARGE AND DISCIPLINE § 17,10
(1989).
The purpose of the pretermination hearing is only to serve as a check against an erroneous
decision, not to settle the rights of the parties. Loudermill does not require an elaborate
pretermination hearing. Some courts have held that oral notice of charges and of the em-
ployer's evidence, together with an informal opportunity to respond, is sufficient under
Loudermill. In general, notice that includes a complete description of the allegations of
wrongdoing and an informal meeting with a supervisor at which the employee has a chance to
respond to the allegations are sufficient. In some circumstances, clue process may require that
the employee be allowed time to prepare a response. The more extensive the posttermination
hearing, the less extensive the pretermination hearing need be.
Loudermill suggests that a suspension without pay might be the appropriate response
when an employer believes that keeping the employee on the job pending a hearing might
represent a significant hazard. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 544-45.




for wrongfl termination of nonunion employees in the private sector.'"
At least forty jurisdictions have created exceptions to the rule, ' based on
tort19 and contract20 theories, and breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.2' Tort causes of action usually involve termi-
nations that violate public policy by firing an employee for a variety of
reasons which include: refusal to commit unlawful acts; performing pub-
lic obligations such as jury duty; exercising statutory rights such as filing
a workers' compensation claim; or reporting an employer's unlawful con-
duct.22 Contract actions are based on a breach of an implied contract to
terminate only for cause.23 The third theory, breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, involves both tort and contract
principles.24
These common-law developments represent important steps towards
the recognition of certain legitimate employee interests, but because the
law is changing, it is also very uncertain. There is enormous tension be-
tween the rule and its exceptions, resulting in theoretical confusion25 and
great uncertainty. Under current case law, it is difficult to know when a
personnel manual gives rise to an implied contract,2 6 when an at-wil
17. For a review of the extensive case law creating exceptions to the at-will rule, see A.D.
HILL, "WRONGFUL DISCHARGE" AND THE DEROGATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT AT-WiLL
DOCTRiNE 13-37 (1987); H. PERRrrT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAw AND PRACTICE 14-16,
chs. 4-5 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1989).




22. A.D. HILT, supra note 17, at 26-33.
23. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr.
211 (1988).
24. For a discussion of the case law on breach of the implied covenant, see A.D. HILL,
supra note 17, at 34-37.
25. For example, courts have had to redefine radically the at-will rule in order to create
the public policy exception. The rule, as originally stated, allowed employers to dismiss "for
good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong." Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81
Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884).
The application of contract principles to the employment relationship, while the at-will
rule is still in place, has raised many theoretical questions. For example, when does an at-will
disclaimer preclude an implied contract, and may an employer unilaterally modify an implied
contract to return an employee to at-will status? The at-will rule in its original incarnation
overrode contract principles. See Feinman, supra note 3. If applying contract principles to the
employment relationship does not deliver the coup de grice to the at-will rule, at least it
reduces it to a rebuttable presumption. This is another unacknowledged redefinition of the
rule.
26. Wooley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 491 A.2d 1257 (NJ. 1985); Toussaint v. Blue Cross
and Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
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disclaimer will be effective,2 7 whether an employer may unilaterally re-
turn an employee to at-will status,28 when a terraination violates public
policy,2 9 and when tort damages are available.30
In addition to uncertainty within each state, there are major differ-
ences between the states. 3 Some jurisdictions have allowed employees to
recover substantial tort damages,32 while others have not recognized any
public policy exception to the at-will rule.33 Thus, an employee fired for
reporting a safety problem to an enforcement agency, for example, may
have a remedy in some states but not in others. This marked disparity
from state to state seems unfair.
Even in states that have recognized causes of action under all three
theories, many employees are left without any remedy. This is in part
because the recognized causes of action are still only exceptions to the
27. See Witt & Goldman, Avoiding Liability in Employee Handbooks, 14 EMPLOYEE REL.
L.J. 5 (1988); Steiner & Dabrow, The Questionable Value of the Inclusion of Language Con-
firming Employment at-Will Status in Company Personnel Documents, 37 LAD. L.J. 639
(1986); Seubert v. McKesson Corp., 5 Individual Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1396 (Cal. Ct. App,
1990).
28. In re Certified Question from the U.S. Court of Appead for the 6th Cir., Bankey v.
Storer Broadcasting Co., 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1989); Pratt v. Brown Mach. Co., 855 F,2d
1225 (6th Cir. 1988); Preston v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, 4 Individual Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA)
493 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Chambers v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 3 Individual Empl. Rts.
Cas. (BNA) 1476 (D. Ariz. 1988); Lee v. Sperry Corp., 678 F. Supp. 1415 (D. Minn. 1987);
Thompson v. King's Entertainment Co., 653 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Va. 1987).
29. The issue of when a termination violates "public policy" has been a difficult one for
the courts. See A.D. HILL, supra note 17, at 26-33; Winters v. Houston Chronicle, 5 Individ-
ual Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1185 (Tex. 1990).
30. In Foley, the California Supreme Court held that tort damages are not recoverable for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,
47 Cal. 3d 654, 700, 765 P.2d 373, 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 239 (1988). At least one case
decided under California law since Foley has held that contract damages for emotional distress
may be recovered when the emotional distress is a foreseeable consequence of the breach of the
employment contract. Mosely v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at
A-6 (Jan. 2, 1990). A chart showing which causes of wrongful termination have been recog-
nized in each state is found at 505 Individual Empl. Rts. Man. (BNA) 21 (1989). Following
the charts are summaries of the case law in each state.
31. See comparisons among California, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and New York, as well
as a state-by-state survey of exceptions to the at-will rule in A.D. HILL, supra note 17, at 55-
138, 185-220.
32. California is one such jurisdiction. J. DERTOUZOS, E. 1HOLLAND & P. EJNER, THU
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION 47 (1988) (hereinafter
J. DERTOUZOS].
33. New York's highest court, for example, has said that the legislature bears the respon
sibility for changing the at-will rule. See Sabetay v. Sterling Drug Inc., 506 N.E.2d 919, 923
(N.Y. 1987), cited in Minda & Raab, supra note 6, at 1138.
Delaware, Florida, and Mississippi have not recognized any exceptions to the rule. Em-
ployment At-Will State Rulings Chart, 505 Individual Empl. Rfs. Man. (BNA) 51 (1989).
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rule of at-will employment. Some courts define public policy narrowly.34
Some look to length of service to determine whether there is an implied
contract,"5 so that only an employee who has served for many years has a
chance of prevailing on that theory. Even then, employers can often de-
feat implied contract claims by using disclaimers in the contract or in the
personnel policy manual.36
Lower paid employees who have only a contract claim have diffi-
culty finding lawyers to represent them because the damages they can
recover are small in relation to the cost of litigation. The majority of
successful plaintiffs are white, male, management or professional employ-
ees. 7 Litigation is an expensive and inefficient means of resolving
wrongful discharge claims, even when substantial damages are
involved.38
In spite of these problems, the courts may have gone as far as they
are likely to go to protect employees against wrongful termination.39 The
application of contract theory has an inherent limitation: if it is the
agreement of the parties that is enforceable, employers can make clear
34. New York, for example, requires that the policy must be expressed in a statute that
explicitly states the policy and explicitly protects the activity in which the employee is en-
gaged. A.D. Hu.L, supra note 17, at 28.
The Texas Supreme Court has thus far recognized a narrow public policy exception for an
employee discharged for refusing to perform an illegal act. Sabine Pilot Ser., Inc. v. Hauck,
687 S.W.2d 733 (rex. 1985). The court held recently that an employee terminated for report-
ing suspected illegal activities within the company to his immediate supervisor did not state a
cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy because he had not been
forced to choose between participating directly in the illegal activities and losing his job. Win-
ters v. Houston Chronicle, 5 Individual Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1185 (Tex. 1990). But see the
concurring opinion of Judge Doggett, urging the court to recognize a broader public policy
exception for employees "who seek, by internal or external report, to bring a halt to activities
in the workplace that have a probable adverse effect upon the public." rd. at 1188.
35. See Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
36. M. McCLAiN, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR EM-
PLOYERS 45-47 (1989); Witt & Goldman, supra note 27.
37. The committee that drafted the Uniform Act estimates that 60 to 80% of successful
plaintiffs nationwide fall into this category. Uniform Act, supra note 5, at 22-23. A California
study of selected cases conducted between 1980 and 1986 found that 67% of all plaintiffs were
men, 89% were white, and 53% were executives or in middle management. J. DERTouzos,
supra note 32, at 21.
38. J. Dertouzos found in his study that defense costs averaged over $80,000. J.
DERTOUZOS, supra note 32, at 39. Net payments to successful plaintiffs, after post trial reduc-
tions, payment of attorneys' fees, and other expenses, were less than 30% of the original jury
verdict. Dertouzos concluded that "the typical plaintiff receives the equivalent of one-half
year's severance pay. By inducing terminated employees to accept such a severance, employ-
ers could save $84,000 in defense fees." Id,
39. See Levine, Judicial Backpedaling. Putting the Brakes on California's Law of Wrong-
ful Termination, 20 PAc. LJ. 993 (1989); St. Antoine, The Revision of Employment-at-Will
Enters a New Phase, 36 LAS. LJ. 563-64 (1985).
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they have not agreed to a just cause standard by using disclaimers.4
Notwithstanding contract principles, the Michigan Supreme Court has
held that employers may unilaterally eliminate just cause protection
merely by giving notice of the change.41 The California Supreme Court
has held that in the employment context, tort damages are not available
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.42 Finally,
although the at-will rule was a judicial creation, California has adopted
the rule by statute,43 and it is unlikely that the courts will take the step of
abolishing it.'
Dissatisfaction with the current state of the law for these reasons has
spurred legislative proposals both on the federal45 and state46 level.
Montana has enacted such legislation;47 bills have been proposed in other
states.48 A committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws has circulated a draft Uniform Employment Termi-
nation Act (Uniform Act).49 Although still controversial, the Uniform
40. St. Antoine, supra note 39, at 563-64.
41. Bankey v. Storer, 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1989).
42. In California, a party injured by a bad-faith breach of an insurance contract by an
insurer may recover tort damages. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032,
108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); see also Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598
P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979). In Foley, the court decided not to allow tort damages for
bad faith breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment con-
tracts. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 693, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 234, 765 P.2d
373, 396 (1988).
43. The California Labor Code provides: "An employment, having no specified term, may
be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other. Employment for a specified
term means an employment for a period greater than one month." CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922
(West 1990).
44. Grodin, supra note 6, at 141. See also Minda & Raab, supra note 6, at 1138 (discuss.
ing the call by New York's highest court to the legislature to change the at-will rule).
Cf the concurring opinion of Judge Doggett in the Texas Supreme Court opinion of Win-
ters v. Houston Chronicle, 5 Individual Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1185, 1188 (Tex. 1990):
[Tihis court has recognized that waiting for the legislature is not the only alternative
available, as it is highly appropriate "to judicially amend a judicially created doc-
trine." (citation omitted) .... [O]ur courts must refine and modify this judicially
created employment-at-will doctrine to prevent dismissal of those who seek, by inter-
nal or external report, to bring to a halt activities in the workplace that have a prob-
able adverse effect upon the public.
45. Stieber & Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: The Need For a Federal Stat-
ute, 16 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 319 (1983).
46. Summers, supra note 6; Bellace, A Right of Fair Dismissal: Enforcing a Statutory
Guarantee, 16 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 207 (1983).
47. Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-
2-914 (1987).
48. Pennsylvania: H. 1020 (1985); New Jersey: A.B. No. 250 (1984); California: S. 222,
Reg. Sess. (1989), S. 282, Reg. Sess. (1989); New York: A. 1933 (1989).
49. Uniform Act, supra note 2. The drafting committee will probably make further
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Act is the product of major compromises between competing interests,5°
bringing statutory employment protection a step closer.
The Uniform Act establishes a good cause standard51 and sets forth
procedures for resolving claims under the statute.52 Depending on which
of three alternatives a state adopts, claims are resolved by arbitration, an
administrative proceeding, or the courts.53 The Uniform Act places the
ultimate burden of proof on the employee.5 It makes reinstatement,
which is not available under common-law wrongful termination theories,
the preferred remedy, 5 with severance available when reinstatement is
not feasible. 56 An early version of the Uniform Act provided for double
changes to the July 1990 version. Uniform Employment-Termination Act Drafting Continues, 5
Individual Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1 (Nov. 6, 1990).
50. Uniform Act, supra note 2. The competing interest groups and their respective posi-
tions are described in Perritt, Wrongful Dismissal Legislation, 35 UCLA L. REV. 65 (1987).
51. Section 2 (a) of the Uniform Act provides: "Except as provided in subsection (b)
[employees with less than one year of service] and (c) [contracts for specified duration] and
Section 4 (agreements between employer and employee), an employer may not terminate the
employment of an employee without good cause." Section 4 of the Act permits written agree-
ments allowing an employer to terminate employment without good cause if minimum sever-
ance payments are made.
Section 1(4) of the Uniform Act defines "good cause" as follows:
(i) a reasonable basis for the termination in light of all relevant factors and circum-
stances, including the employee's duties and responsibilities, the employee's conduct
and employment record, and the appropriateness of the penalty for the conduct in-
volved, or (ii) good faith management judgment as to the legitimate economic needs
of the employer to organize or reorganize operations, make decisions about the size
and composition of the workforce, or determine and change reasonable performance
standards for positions.
52. Uniform Act, supra note 2, § 5.
53. M,7 § 6 (arbitration), app. alternative A, § 5 (administrative proceeding), app. alterna-
tive B, § 5 Oudicial proceeding).
54. Id § 6(e). This section also provides that if an employee establishes that a termina-
tion was motivated by unlawful discrimination, the employer has the burden of proving that it
would have made the same decision even in the absence of discrimination. This essentially
incorporates the holding of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989), one of the
Supreme Court decisions that the Civil Rights Bill aimed to overturn. See id (conference
comment). A better rule would be one providing that a termination motivated by unlawful
discrimination is per se unlawful even if discrimination is not the only motive.
55. Id §§ 7(b)(1)-7(b)(3) (conference comment). The comment does not explain why re-
instatement is the preferred remedy, but simply states that severance pay may be awarded
when reinstatement is not feasible "because of the personal relations between the employer and
the employee, changes in the employer's business, or other appropriate grounds." Idc § 7(bX3)
conference comment.
The authors of the Gould report pointed to the unavailability of reinstatement as "a major
deficiency in the existing law." GOULD REPORT, supra note 6, at 5-6. The drafters believed
that "the average employee who loses his job and perceives the termination to be unjust or
unfair generally would prefer reinstatement." Id. At the same time, the report cautions
against automatic or indiscriminate recourse to reinstatement. Id at 5.
56. Uniform Act, supra note 2, § 7(b)(3).
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backpay and punitive damages for egregious violations, but these reme-
dies were eliminated from the July 1990 version."
The Uniform Act extinguishes state common-law claims "sounding
in tort, contract, or otherwise, if the claim for relief is based on the termi-
nation of employment of the employee, on acts reasonably taken to effec-
tuate the termination.""8 It does not, however, preempt rights under a
collective bargaining agreement or under an express contract.59 It allows
employer and employee to agree, in writing, to at-will status on the con-
dition that the contract provides for minimum severance pay.' Employ-
ers are required to provide employees a written statement of reasons
upon termination.61
This Note focuses on an aspect of statutory employment protection
which the Uniform Act does not address. A few simple steps taken
before termination might help prevent wrongful terminations, alleviate
the emotional distress associated with terminations, and facilitate reem-
ployment if the employee is terminated. The Uniform Act could require
notice and an opportunity to respond at an informal meeting, as the
French employment protection statutes now require. 62
Such pretermination safeguards are important for several reasons.
First, experience in many countries has shown that reinstatement is not
often feasible63 and that when it does occur, the employee often does not
last long.64 The risk of retaliation against a reinstated employee is un-
doubtedly greater where there is no union to protect the employee on the
job. The vast majority of employees in this country do not belong to a
57. Id. at 24.
The Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, in contrast, allows punitive
damages "if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the employer engaged in
actual fraud or actual malice in the discharge of the employee" in violation of the act. MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(2) (1990).
58. Uniform Act, supra note 2, § 3(c).
59. Id ,
60. Id. § 4(b).
61. Id. § 5(b).
62. See infra text accompanying notes 181-302.
63. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV.
1, 28-32 (citing studies of reinstatement under the National Labor Relations Act); Simkin,
Some Results of Reinstatement by Arbitration, 41 ARB. J. 53 (1986); Sherman, Reinstatement
as a Remedy for Unfair Dismissal in Common Market Countries, 29 AM. J. CoMp. L. 467
(1981); L. DICKENS, M. JONES, B. WEEKES & M. HART, DISMISSED: A STUDY OF UNFAIR
DISMISSAL AND THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL SYSTEM (1985) [hereinafter L. DIcKENS] (under
the United Kingdom's unfair dismissal law); Estreicher, Unjust Dismissal Laws. Some Caution-
ary Notes, 33 AM. J. CoMP. L. 310, 319 (1985).
64. West, supra note 63, at 28-30; Simkin, supra note 63, at 55-56.
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union. 6 ' Therefore, even if legislation makes reinstatement the preferred
remedy in theory, in practice the most common remedy will be severance
pay.
Severance pay does not protect the employee's interest in job secur-
ity very effectively. 66 Pretermination safeguards would protect this inter-
est by preventing wrongful discharges. Labor law Professor Robert L.
Rabin has said in discussing procedural rights of public employees that
"the right to receive a meaningful explanation of what is being done to
the individual" is the indispensable "core safeguard against arbitrari-
ness."67 The Uniform Act requires a statement of reasons, but if this
requirement is to function as a safeguard, the statement should be pro-
vided before termination. In short, the Uniform Act could require, in
addition to the statement of reasons, notice and an informal meeting
before the termination takes effect.
I will examine the role of pretermination safeguards in the employ-
ment protection statutes of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.
These three countries together represent a spectrum in terms of the de-
gree of protection afforded to employees. Germany has very strong em-
ployment protection legislation within a framework of codetermination,
a system which makes employees partners in management through their
elected representatives.68 Its pretermination procedures play an impor-
tant role in the overall statutory scheme.6 9 The United Kingdom has the
weakest employment security legislation in the European Community.70
The remedies available under the United Kingdom's unfair dismissal
statute are widely criticized as inadequate,71 and pretermination safe-
65. Union membership fell to about 16.4% of the workforce nationwide in 1989. Union
Membership Down to 16.4 Percent of Workers in 1989, BLS Survey Shows, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 27, at A-A (Feb. 8, 1990). This figure does not reflect the fact that some workers
are represented who are not members.
66. Severance pay could, of course, have some deterrent effect if set at a high enough level.
One commentator recommends, in lieu of reinstatement and tort remedies, a statutory award
of two months pay for each year of service with the employer, plus back pay until the em-
ployee obtains equivalent employment. West, supra note 63, at 56-57.
67. Rabin, Job Security and Due Proces" Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through A
Reasons Requirement 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 60, 79 (1976).
68. See Summers, An American Perspective of the German Model of Worker Participation.
8 Comp. LAB. LJ. 333 (1987) [hereinafter Summers, German Worker Participation]; infra text
accompanying notes 78-302.
69. See id,
70. Hepple, The Implementation of the Community Charter of Fundamental Social
Rights, 53 MOD. L. RFv. 643, 653 (1990) [hereinafter Hepple, EC Charter of Social Rights].
71. See generally L. DIcKENs, supra note 63; Anderman, The Weakened Edifice of Job
Protection Laws in Britain, 20 STAN. J. INT'L L. 393 (1984); Napier, Deregulation, Flexibility
and Individual Labour Law in the United Kingdom, 6 HoPsrRA LAB. LJ. 101 (1988); Carty,
1991]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
guards are left to the discretion of employers or to collective
bargaining.
7 2
The French system contains some desirable features that might be
adaptable to conditions in the United States. France, unlike other West-
ern European nations, has a union density73 almost as low as the United
States.7' The large nonunion workforce therefore depends primarily on
statutory protection of employment rights, 75 as would be the case in the
United States. Employee participation in France is generally more lim-
ited than in Germany, and employee representatives play a less active
role in the pretermination procedures required by statute. The French
legislation offers more effective protection than the British,76 yet its legis-
lation is more deferential to management than the German employment
protection measures.
Part II provides an overview of the development of statutory em-
ployment protection in Western Europe, beginning with nineteenth cen-
tury notice requirements. In Part II, I also briefly call attention to the
relationship between modern statutory reforms and international
standards.
Part III compares the German, British, and French systems, focus-
ing on pretermination safeguards and assessing the role of reinstatement.
While the German model is effective and in many respects worth emulat-
ing, it is not transferable to the United States without a radical transfor-
mation in employment relations. The British experience confirms the
view of some plaintiffs' attorneys in the United States that employees
may be worse off under the wrong kind of statute, or under a statute
enforced in a manner that is overly deferential to management, than they
are at the present time.7 7
Dismissed Employees The Search for a More Effective Range of Remedies, 52 MoD. L. REV.
449 (1989).
72. See infra text accompanying notes 181-302.
73. Union density refers to the proportion of the workforce that is unionized.
74. In 1987, the union density in France was under 20%. Nelson, The Vredeling Direc-
tive: The EEC's Failed Attempt to Regulate Multinational Enterprises and Organize Collective
Bargaining, 20 N.Y.U.J. INT'L. L. & POL. 967, 983 (1988).
75. See T. HONoRP, THE QUEST FOR SECURITY: EMPLOYEES, TENANTS, WivEs 21
(1982).
In France, the statutory scheme does not exempt union employees. It establishes a gener-
ally applicable floor of rights; collective bargaining agreements can improve on the protection
provided. See id.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 181-302.
77. This impression is based primarily on conversations with plaintiffs' attorneys. See also
West, supra note 63, at 65 ("If statutory reform accompanied by new and more effectlvc reme-
dies is not politically feasible, then private sector employees may fare better under the present
common law system.") In jurisdictions where the courts have largely refused to recognize
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The notice and pretermination features of the French legislation,
however, are conservative steps in the right direction, and they could be
adapted to conditions in the United States. In Part IV, I propose similar
provisions that the drafters of the Uniform Act should add to the pro-
posed legislation.
]I. DEVELOPMENT OF STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT
PROTECTION AND OF INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS
Summary
Employment security legislation in Western Europe developed in
three stages. At the turn of the century, many countries enacted notice
requirements. After World War II, legislation expanded and strength-
ened these rights to notice. In 1951 Germany enacted a pioneering em-
ployment protection statute which served as a model for new
international and national standards. Statutory protection requiring a
valid reason for termination began to develop in other countries in the
1960s and 1970s, in accord with a 1963 Recommendation and the 1982
Convention of the International Labor Organization.
A. Historical Background
1. Notice Requirements
Many European nations adopted statutory notice requirements in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.7" This development
occurred after contract principles had replaced medieval rules as the the-
causes of action for wrongfuil termination and are unlikely to do so, legislation appears to be
the only avenue of reform available. See Minda & Raab, supra note 6.
78. Hepple, Security of Employment, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 355 (R. Blanpain 3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW]. Civil
law countries adopted notice requirements either by amending the codes or by enacting auxil-
iary statutes. Id §§ 45-47. On nineteenth and early twentieth century developments, see THE
MAKING OF LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NINE COUNTRIES UP To
1945 (B. Hepple ed. 1986) [hereinafter LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE TO 1945]. On twentieth
century developments, see Hepple, Security of Employment, supra.
Denmark enacted legislation requiring notice to rural and domestic workers in 1854; simi-
lar rights were extended to salaried employees by case law. France adopted notice require-
ments by amending the Code du travail in 1890 and in 1924; Belgium enacted legislation
requiring notice to manual workers in 1900 and for white-collar workers in 1922. The Nether-
lands required notice in the Contract of Employment Act of 1907; Germany required notice by
legislation enacted in 1869 and 1897 and reform of the Civil Code in 1900, and Italy required
notice for white-collar workers in a royal decree of 1924. England, in contrast, did not enact
comparable legislation until the enactment of the Contracts of Employment Act of 1963. LA-
BOUR LAW IN EUROPE TO 1945, supra, at 182-83.
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oretical basis for regulating the employment relationship.79 Over the
course of the nineteenth century, the employment relationship came to
be treated as a contract. Under contract theory, employer and employee
were free to terminate the employment relationship" The new approach
treated the parties to an employment contract as theoretical equals, ig-
noring the inequality in bargaining power between -them. Notice require-
ments were probably adopted to mitigate the harsh effects of the new rule
for workers, who often had no resources to subsist on after being sud-
denly dismissed.81 As a result of these reforms, in most European coun-
tries the employer's right to terminate an employee for any reason has
been subject to a notice requirement for many years.8 2 In contrast, no
such condition attached to the at-will rule that developed in the United
States at about the same time. Customary notice requirements predated
statutory ones in many regions and trades of Europe. The legislators
often adopted customary notice periods or incorporated them by refer-
ence. 3 The amount of notice required by statute therefore varied de-
pending on occupation, periodicity of wages, and other factors.84 Most
of these statutes treated notice as a reciprocal and equal obligation of
employer and employee.8 5
The statutes allowed termination without notice in cases of gross
misconduct by the employee.8 6 While some statutes enumerated exam-
ples of gross misconduct, the essential criterion that developed through
case law was whether it was impossible to continue a normal working
relationship. 7 An employer who failed to terminate an employee within
a specified time after learning of misconduct waived the right to summa-
79. Hepple, Security of Employment, supra note 78, §§ 45-46.
80. In England, however, much of the law of master and servant survived well into the
nineteenth century and overlapped with rules based on contract principles, quitting remained
punishable as a criminal offense until 1875. See Hepple & Fredman, Great Britain [hereinafter
Great Britain], in 5 (Monographs) INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS § 263 (R. Blanpain ed. 1987) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA].
81. However, notice requirements were used to penalize striking employees in England,
As a result, the trade unions sometimes sought shorter rather than longer notice requirements,
See id § 267.
82. Hepple, Security of Employment, supra note 78, § 47.
83. LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE TO 1945, supra note 78, at 182.
84. Id. at 181-82.
85. Id. at 182. In England, employees who quit without notice risked imprisonment for
breach of contract under the Master and Servant Act until this law was repealed in 1875. Id.
at 183.
86. Id at 185.
87. Id at 186.
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rily dismiss the employee on the basis of that misconduct.3 8
The statutory notice requirements of this period tended to benefit
primarily white-collar employees, who were typically paid on a monthly
or an annual basis. When the amount of notice required depended on the
periodicity of wages, workers paid monthly were entitled to much more
notice than hourly workers. 9 The notice for an hourly worker could be
less than a day.'
During the period in which notice requirements were enacted, some
lower French courts tried to go beyond the enforcement of notice provi-
sions and to recognize a broader right to protection against unfair dis-
charges. In some cases they awarded damages for abusive termination,
relying on the theory of abus de droit.91 The Court of Cassation'2
thwarted these judicial efforts by strictly interpreting the provision of the
French Civil Code, which provided that an employment contract of in-
definite duration could be terminated at the will of either party.93 The
legislature reacted by amending the Civil Code in 1890 to allow the
courts to award damages for unilateral termination of an employment
contract.94 In 1928 it enacted a law authorizing the courts to determine
whether a termination involved an abuse of right.9" These reforms pro-
vided little real protection, however, because the employee's burden of
proof in such cases was almost insurmountable.96
88. This was the rule in Belgium, under the law of 10 March 1900 (manual workers) and
7 August 1922 (white-collar workers). Id
89. Recently the German Federal Constitutional Court found that use of a less advanta-
geous means of calculating notice for blue-collar employees violated the constitution. Decision
of 16 Nov. 1982, EzA art. 3, GRUNDMGESE= [GG] No. 13, cited in Weiss, Individual Employ-
ment Rights: Focussing on Job Security in the Federal Republic of Germany, 67 NEB. L REV.
82, 85 (1988) [hereinafter Weiss, Job Security in Germany].
90. LABOUR LAW iN EUROPE TO 1945, supra note 78, at 183. In England, required no-
tice could be as short as two hours in the construction industry, even with a collective agree-
ment. Id
91. Abus de droit means abuse of a legal right, such as a contract right. In this context, it
means an abuse of the right to terminate an employee. For a brief discussion in English of
these decisions, see id at 187-88.
92. The Court of Cassation is the court of last resort for cases other than those to which
the government is a party.
93. LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE TO 1945, supra note 78, at 188. See also Despax & Rojot,
France, in 4 (Monographs) ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 80, § 223 [hereinafter France] (discuss-
ing former section 1780 of the French Civil Code.).
94. LABoUR LAW IN EUROPE TO 1945, supra note 78, at 188.
95. Id
96. Id During this period, it was a common practice to dismiss women when they mar-
ried. The first statute prohibiting the dismissal of women because of pregnancy or childbirth
was enacted in France in 1909. Other countries passed comparable legislation much later. rd
at 184-85.
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2. Legislation Requiring a Valid Reason for Termination
The first legislation requiring an objective reason for dismissal was
enacted in Germany during the Weimar Republic, when unemployment
had reached disastrous levels. 7 The Works Councils Act of 1920 at-
tempted to strike a balance between employees' interest in job security
and employers' traditional managerial prerogatives. Considered a mod-
erate reform, it was designed to integrate the working class and to
weaken the influence of unions; it was enacted over the unions'
objections. 8
The Works Councils Act not only required a reason for dismissal, it
also provided a means of challenging dismissals before they took effect. 99
Employees could appeal their dismissal to the works councils, commit-
tees comprised of elected representatives of the employees. Grounds for
appeal included discrimination because of sex, religion, political or mili-
tary activities, or trade union membership; the employer's failure to state
the reasons for the dismissal; and dismissal for reasons unrelated to the
conduct of the worker or to the situation of the enterprise. 1°° If the
works council decided that the appeal was well-founded, it could negoti-
ate with the employer to retain the employee. If this effort failed, either
the employee or the works council could appeal to a labor court. A court
would not impose reinstatement on an unwilling employer; if a termina-
tion was found to be unlawful but the employer would not accept rein-
statement, the court awarded severance pay of one-twelfth of wages for
each year of service with the employer, up to a maximum of a half year's
salary.101
Although the works councils were abolished by the Nazi regime,
workers reestablished them after World War 11.102 The Works Councils
97. Id. at 188.
98. Unions objected to the provisions on worker participation. Worker participation had
been introduced in the late nineteenth century, in part to combat union influence. At first
unions opposed these employer-sponsored institutions. Later, after unions had adopted a re-
form-oriented strategy, they formulated counter-proposals for worker participation. These
proposals involved close collaboration between unions and work; councils.
The Works Council Act of 1920, though a compromise measure was more acceptable to
employers than to unions, and the unions objected to its worker participation provisions. Af-
ter its enactment, however, the unions sought ways to overcome the institutional separation
between unions and works councils. Eventually, they succeeded in winning greater powers for
the councils. Weiss, Federal Republic of Germany, in 5 (Monographs) ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra
note 80, §§ 351-352 [hereinafter Germany].
99. LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE TO 1945, supra note 78, at 188-89.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 189.
102. Germany, supra note 98, § 352.
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Act served as a model for postwar employment protection legislation not
only in Germany but in the rest of Europe.103
After the war, some countries enacted employment security meas-
ures, for the most part limited in scope."0 These measures included
lengthening the notice period, 15 requiring that notice be in writing, and
requiring a statement of reasons." 6 The German Act on Dismissal Pro-
tection of 1951,1 7 however, went far beyond the modest reforms else-
where, and eventually served as a model for other countries. 108
The 1951 Act restored and strengthened many of the provisions of
the 1920 Works Councils Act. It established for the first time the princi-
ple that ordinary dismissals are generally "socially unwarranted."10 9 Or-
dinary dismissals are permitted only for reasons enumerated in the
statute. 110 Acceptable reasons include misconduct, repeated absences
103. LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE TO 1945, supra note 78, at 189.
104. Italy in 1947, 1950; The Netherlands in 1945, 1953; France in 1950; Belgium in 1955.
Id.
105. Great Britain, supra note 80, § 267; Treu, Protection Against Unfair Discharge in It-
aly, in PROTECTING UNORGANIZED EMPLOYEES AGAINST UNJUST DISCHARGE 159-60 (1.
Stieber & J.D. Blackburn eds. 1983) (1n Italy, notice, as established by collective bargaining
agreement, practice, or equity, was required by Article 2118 of the Civil Code).
106. Treu, supra note 105, at 149-50, 160.
107. The English translation of the Act as subsequently reenacted and amended can be
found in Weiss, Federal Republic of Germany, in 1 (Legislation) ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note
80, at 229 [hereinafter Germany (Legislation)].
108. The Netherlands also enacted relatively strong employment protection measures, but
of a different type. The Dutch response to postwar labor shortages and related economic dilfi-
culties was to institute administrative regulation of employment termination. The Extraordi-
nary Decree on Labour Relations of 1945 required both employers and employees to obtain
permission from the Labor Exchange, an administrative agency, before severing an employ-
ment relationship. This system is still in place, with some modifications. Dutch law still re-
quires employers to obtain authorization before terminating an employee. Few countries have
adopted such an administrative approach. France experimented with administrative
preauthorization for permanent layoffs, but eliminated it in 1987.
109. Act on Dismissal Protection of 1951 provides:
1. Socially unwarranted dismissals
(1) The dismissal of an employee who has been a party to an employment rela-
tionship with the same establishment or undertaking for more than six consecutive
months shall be invalid if it is socially unwarranted.
(2) A dismissal shall be deemed socially unwarranted if it is not due to factors
connected with the person or conduct of the employee or to urgent operating require-
ments which preclude his continued employment in the establishment ....
Germany (Legislation), supra note 107, at 229.
"Extraordinary dismissals," defined as those for compelling and urgent reasons such as
grave misconduct or an emergency, are treated differently. Id Dismissal is permitted if the
reasons are sufficiently serious, and failure to provide notice may also bejustified under certain
circumstances. Id. Extraordinary dismissals are exceptional; most dismissals fall into the cat-
egory of ordinary dismissals. See Germany, supra note 98, §§ 179-181.
110. Germany, supra note 98, §§ 182-188.
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due to illness, and economic constraints such as those caused by changed
technology or restructuring. Even when these problems are present, the
employee should not be dismissed if transfer to another job is a feasible
alternative."'
The German Dismissal Act also imposes on employers who must
terminate employees for economic reasons a duty.to take into account
the social aspects of termination when they select the employees to be
terminated." 2 Employees who would suffer the most from losing their
jobs, for example because of their age or family responsibilities, should be
retained if possible. The obligation to consider the social aspects of ter-
mination in addition to the company's operational needs applies when-
ever employees are terminated for economic reasons, whether they are
terminated individually or as a group."'
France and the United Kingdom first enacted employment protec-
tion statutes in the 1970s. In 1973 France passed a law requiring genuine
and serious grounds for dismissal. 4 During the debates on the legisla-
tion, the Minister of Labor defined "genuine and serious grounds" as a
reason "of an objective nature, which should exclude prejudice and per-
sonal convenience .... [flor instance, professional incompetence or reor-
ganization of the enterprise."' 1 5 What constitutes genuine and serious
cause is being defined further by the industrial tribunals and by the re-
viewing courts, much as just cause in the United States has been defined
through decisions of labor arbitrators.1 1 6
France enacted legislation specifically addressing dismissals for eco-
nomic reasons in 1975.17 The 1975 law, as originally enacted, required
employers to obtain authorization from the Labor Inspectorate before
proceeding with economic dismissals. 1 This law also extended certain
key provisions of industry-wide collective bargaining agreements negoti-
ated in 1969 and 1974 to most of the workforce." 9 Pre-authorization
was eliminated in 1986, but other safeguards against arbitrary or avoid-
able layoffs, including consultation rights, were strengthened.'2
The United Kingdom began to enact employment protection legisla-
111. Id.
112. Id. § 187.
113. Id.
114. See France, supra note 93, §§ 226-266.
115. Id. § 241.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 181-302.
117. France, supra note 93, § 225.
118. Id. § 267.
119. Id.
120. See infra text accompanying notes 181-302.
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tion in the 1960s. The Contracts of Employment Act of 1963 fixed mini-
mum periods of notice 1 ' for employers and employees and also required
employers to provide written notice of certain terms."z The 1965 Re-
dundancy Payments Act provided for severance pay, paid by the em-
ployer and partially reimbursed by the government, for some of the
employees who lose their jobs for economic reasons. 2
The Industrial Relations Act of 1971124 created a cause of action for
unfair dismissal in the United Kingdom for the first time. The unfair
dismissal provisions are now included in the Employment Protection
(Consolidation) Act of 1978 (EPCA).
For covered employees,'" the EPCA makes dismissal for specified
reasons, including union membership or nonmembership, unfair per
se.' 26 But most cases are not in the unfair per se categories, and for those
cases the courts have developed a standard that is extremely deferential
to management.127 Rather than setting a standard for employers to live
up to, this deferential definition of fairness reflects existing norms.' 28 It
is similar to a good faith or reasonableness standard which some manage-
ment-side lawyers have proposed for the United States.'2 9
B. International Standards
1. The International Labor Organization
In 1963 the International Labor Organization (ILO)1 3o issued the
121. Contracts of Employment Act 1963, § 1.
122. Id. § 4.
123. Redundancy Payments Act, 1965, § 1.
124. This is now superseded by the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch.
44, as amended by Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42, and Employment Act, 1982, ch. 42.
Unfair dismissal was only one area covered by the Act. The Act was designed to restruc-
ture collective bargaining and other aspects of employment relations, among other reasons in
order to reduce strike activity. It was strongly influenced by the United States National Labor
Relations Act. See A.W.J THOMPSON & S.R. ENGLEMAN, THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AcT
(1975); B. WEEKES, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE LiMrrs OF LAw (1975).
125. For a discussion of the shrinking coverage of the EPCA, see infmr notes 257-59 and
accompanying text.
126. Great Britain, supra note 80, § 270.
127. For a discussion of the substantive standard, see infra notes 229-36 and accompanying
text.
128. In the words of P. Elias, the standard is "norm-reflecting rather than norm-setting."
Great Britain, supra note 80, § 272 (citing Elias, 10 INDUS. LU. 201 (1981)).
129. See the dissenting minority report, which proposes a "good faith basis test." GOULD
REPORT, supra note 6, at 40 (minority report at 3). See also Perritt, supra note 50, at 8081.
130. The ILO was formed in 1919 and is now an agency of the United Nations. As of
December 1988 it had 150 members, including all the members of the European Community.
It has a tripartite structure. Each member country sends delegates representing workers, man-
agement, and the government, who vote independently from one another. V.Y. GHEIAL,
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Recommendation on Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the
Employer (cited as Termination of Employment Recommendation).' 31
The Recommendation calls for a policy of requiring a valid reason for
termination of employment.'32 Dismissals because of union membership,
race, religion, sex, marital status, social origin, or political opinion
"should not constitute valid reasons for termination of employment." 133
Although influenced by the example of the German Dismissal Act of
1951, it was designed to allow each country to determine the means of
fulfilling its objectives that are best suited to national conditions.
In addition to the substantive requirement of a valid reason, the Ter-
mination of Employment Recommendation suggested a reasonable no-
tice requirement and procedural safeguards to govern dismissals. 134 In
case of reduction in the workforce, selection of those workers to be af-
fected should be made according to "precise criteria, which... should be
established wherever possible in advance ....
By 1981, sixty-five countries had enacted legislation that substan-
tially met the standards set out in the Recommendation. 36 The follow-
THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION 103, 121-25 (1989). The member countries of
the ILO are listed in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 338-39 (1990).
The United States withdrew from the ILO in 1975 (effective 1977), but rejoined in 1980.
As of January 1, 1990, it had ratified only 7 out of over 160 Conventions. Id. at 338-41. In
1988 the United States ratified a major ILO Convention for the first time (No. 144, calling for
tripartite consultations on labor issues). Ratification of several important conventions is under
consideration. See Linsenmayer, US. Ends ILO Moratorium by Ratifying Two Conventions,
111 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 52 (1988).
131. Int'l Labor Org., Termination ofEmployment Recommendation, 1963 (No. 119), in 1
(Codex) ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 80, at 522.
132. Section 2(1) provides: "Termination of employment should not take place unless there
is a valid reason for such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or
based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service." Id. § 2.
The Recommendation was designed to be implemented through national legislation, col.
lective agreements, court decisions or other means appropriate to the conditions and institu-
tions of each nation. Id § 1. In accordance with this approach, the definition of "valid
reason" was left for each implementing nation to define, subject to the broad principles of
nondiscrimination and substantive and procedural fairness announced in the Recommenda-
tion. Id § 2(2).
133. Id § 3. The recommendation singles out for protection several categories not men-
tioned in either Title VII or the National Labor Relations Act, such as marital status, political
opinion and social origin.
134. See id. §§ 4, 5, 7. Section 11(5) states:
Before a decision to dismiss a worker for serious misconduct becomes finally effec-
tive, the worker should be given an opportunity to state his case promptly, with the
assistance where appropriate of a person representing him.
Id § 11(5).
135. Id § 15.




ing year, the ILO adopted the Convention on Termination of
Employment at the Initiative of the Employer,137 which reaffirmed the
principles expressed in the 1963 Recommendation. The Convention set
forth important procedural protections concerning individual dismissals,
including reasonable notice or compensation in lieu of notice, 1 38 an op-
portunity to respond,139 and the right to appeal to an impartial body,
such as a court, labor tribunal, arbitration committee, or arbitrator."
Such reviewing bodies are to "be empowered to reach a conclusion on
the reason for the termination."' 41 Recommendations that accompanied
the Convention suggested requiring notification in writing, appropriate
warnings in cases of misconduct, and both instructions and a warning in
case of unsatisfactory performance. 4 2
Countries which have ratified the Convention have implemented its
goals in part by means of legislation requiring a valid reason for dismis-
sal. 43 These countries have developed two types of procedural safe-
guards: one requires employers to consult with employee representatives
before terminating employees; the other employs specified procedures
137. Int'l Labor Org., Termination of Employment Convention, 1982 (No. 158), in I (Co-
dex) ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 80 [hereinafter ILO Convention].
The Convention received strong support from the nations of the European Community:
the employer, employee, and government delegates from Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland,
and Italy all voted in favor. The employee and government delegates from the United King-
dom, Denmark, Greece, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands voted in favor of the Convention;
the employer representatives from those countries supported the wrongful termination portion
of the Convention but abstained because they disagreed with the provisions concerning dismis-
sals for economic or structural reasons.
The United States was the only major nation opposing the Convention to take an official
position against the concept of just cause for discharge. The U.S. government delegates
strongly opposed the requirement of a valid reason as well as the provisions for appealing a
dismissal- INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION CONFERENcE No. 8(2), 67th Sess.
(1982).
138. ILO Convention, supra note 137, art. 11.
139. Article 7 provides: The employment of a worker shall not be terminated for reasons
related to the worker's conduct or performance before he is provided an opportunity to defend
himself against the allegations made, unless the employer cannot reasonably be expected to
provide this opportunity. Ide art. 7.
140. Id art. 8(l)-(2).
141. Id art. 9(2)(b).
142. Int'l Labor Org., Termination of Employment Recommendation, 1982 (No. 166), in 1
(Codex) ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 80, §§ 7, 8, 12 [hereinafter 1982 Recommendation].
143. The majority of countries in the world now have legislation requiring that dismissals
must be for justified reasons. Hepple, Security of Employment, supra note 78, § 56. France
and Germany have ratified the Convention, but the United Kingdom has not. The United
Kingdom stands out within the European Community as a country whose employment protec-
tion measures do not meet the standards of the 1982 Convention.
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and rules designed to ensure fairness in the process. 144 The two methods
may complement each other. Procedures generally include an investiga-
tion of the facts, a right to a hearing to respond to any charges and to be
represented at such a hearing, and the right to appeal the decision. 145
The German system places greater emphasis on consultation, the French
system on procedural requirements. The United Kingdom has not rati-
fied the Convention, and its dis~missal legislation does not meet Conven-
tion standards."4
2. The European Community
The social policies of the European Community have also en-
couraged the development of employment protection legislation within
the member nations. 47 The Community's Council of Ministers demon-
strated its support for employment protection measures in approving the
Social Action Programme of 1974.148 This program called for voluntary
action by each member nation to improve living and working conditions,
in accord with the general goals expressed in the treaty founding the
Community.' 49 The program also advocated increased involvement of
labor and management in the economic and social decisions of the Com-
munity, and of employee participation in the enterprises in which they
work. 150 Member countries differ greatly as to the nature and extent of
employee participation, however, and this issue was in the 1970s and
continues to be controversial. In part for this reason, the program was
accepted only as a nonbinding statement of policy.
The Council also adopted three directives designed to mitigate the
144. Id. § 62. Such rules have developed through collective bargaining and judicial deci-
sions as well as through legislation.
145. Id.
146. The United Kingdom has ratified few ILO conventions since 1978, and in recent years
has denounced at least five previously ratified conventions. Hepple, Social Rights in the Euro.
pean Community: A British Perspective, 11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 425 (1990) [hereinafter Hepple,
Social Rights in the EC].
The U.K.'s recent labor legislation has been disapproved by ILO Committees for incom-
patibility with ILO standards. See Hepple, EC Charter of Social Rights, supra note 70, at 653
(citing the INT'L LABOR ORG. COMM. OF EXPERIS No. 3, pt. 4A, at 235-41 (1989); K. Ew-
ING, BRITAIN AND THE ILO (1989)).
147. Schnorr, European Communities, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW, supra note 78, at
113.
148. Council Resolution of Jan. 21, 1974, 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 13) 1 (1974) (con-
cerning a social programme).
149. Id.; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art, 117,
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179 II), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 1 (Codex) ENCYCLO-




effects on employees of technological change, economic restructuring,
and recession. Directives, unlike the nonbinding Social Action Pro-
gramme, require member countries to implement the goals set forth in
the directives by means of national legislation.'15  The 1975 directive on
plant closures and economic dismissals' 52 requires notice and consulta-
tion with worker representatives before reducing the workforce. In 1977
the Council issued a directive on Acquired Rights of Employees in Event
of Transfer of Undertaking. 1 3 The two directives were followed by an-
other on protecting employees' interests in the event of insolvency of
their employer. 54
Germany, which had already adopted similar measures, is fully in
compliance with all three directives.' 55 As to the Community as a whole,
however, at least one expert in the area of Community social and labor
policies has concluded that these three directives have been only margin-
ally effective.' 56 The United Kingdom, in particular, has implemented
the directives in a defective manner.'15 Among other deficiencies, its leg-
islation does not cover all the categories of employers and employees the
directives were intended to include, and the consultation requirements
fall short of the directives' standards. 158
Employee participation, which is fundamental to employment pro-
tection in Germany, is an area of great difference between member coun-
tries. It continues to be one of the most controversial aspects of
Community measures in the employment arena.'5 9 The government of
the United Kingdom, together with employer groups in the community,
have successfully opposed the adoption of various proposals for increas-
ing participation."6
The prospect of a unified market in 1992 has created new pressures
151. Schnorr, supra note 147, at 115.
152. Council Directive of Feb. 17 1975, 18 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 48) 29 (1975) (on
collective redundancies).
153. Council Directive of Feb. 14, 1977, 20 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 61) 26 (1977) (on
employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings).
154. Council Directive of 20 Oct 1980, 23 OJ. EuR. COMM. (No. L 283) 23 (1980) (on
protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer).
155. Weiss, Labor Law and Industrial Relations in Europe 1992" A German Perspective. 11
COMp. LAB. LJ. 411, 416 (1990).
156. Blanpain, 1992 and Beyond The Impact of the European Community on the Labour
Law Systems of the Member Countries, 11 COMp. LAB. LU. 403, 410 (1990) [hereinafter
Blanpain, Community Labour Law].
157. See Hepple, Social Rights in the EC, supra note 146, at 432 (enumerating the ways in
which implementation is defective).
158. Id
159. Blanpain, Community Labour Law, supra note 156, at 410.
160. See generally Schnorr, supra note 147, at 124-25; Harvey, Employee Involvement in
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to harmonize labor standards, in part to avoid "social dumping," the
shifting of economic activities to parts of Europe where labor costs are
lower and employment protection and social insurance measures are less
developed. In December 1989 the heads of government of eleven coun-
tries adopted the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of
Workers, with only the government of the United Kingdom opposed. 161
The goals of the Charter are to harmonize and to improve 62 the living
and working conditions of employees in the Community and the regula-
tion of collective dismissals, and to further develop employee
participation.
The Charter suggests that the Community may attempt to improve
protective legislation in those countries where it is weaker, such as Brit-
ain. Like the Social Action Program of the 1970s, however, the Charter
is not directly binding on member states, but must be implemented by
means of Community and national legislation. 1 3 The implementation
process is likely to prove difficult. Institutional harmonization is unreal-
istic because labor relations systems are so different from country to
country.164 A different sort of stumbling block to harmonization is the
resistance by the government of the United Kingdom to the imposition of
Community standards on its social policies and on its labor and employ-
ment law.1 65 This is a very concrete problem, because the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) Treaty requires a unanimous vote to enact
Decisionmaking: European Attempts at Harmonization, 16 MicI1. J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 415,
442-43 (1984).
A draft regulation for a Statute on European Companies, EUR. CoMM. BULL. SUPP. No.
4 (1975), modeled after German law, proposed a codetermination system in large companies
operating in several countries of the Community. The Vredeling Proposal, a final draft of
which was approved by the European Parliament in 1982, would have given extensive informa-
tion and consultation rights to employees of large multinational corporations. See The Vredel-
ing Proposal: Information and Consultation of Employees in Multinational Enterprises (1983),
as revised, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 240) 83 (1983); R. BLANPAIN, THE VREDELINO PRO.
POSAL (1983). The Vredeling proposal was not adopted for a variety of reasons, including
opposition from employers, the government of the United Kingdom, and some trade unions.
See Nelson, supra note 74.
161. Hepple, Social Rights in the EC, supra note 146, at 425.
162. There is some uncertainty about whether the Charter is a mandate to improve condi-
tions in all countries, but a conservative interpretation is that it aims at least to raise standards
where they are lowest, in order to achieve a harmonization of labor standards and social poli-
cies. See Bercusson, The European Community's Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of
Workers, 53 MoD. L. REV. 624, 628 (1990).
163. Employment Regulation in a United Europe, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 121, at S.1
(June 22, 1990).
164. See Treu, European Unification and Italian Labor Relations, 11 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 441,
447 (1990).
165. Hepple, EC Charter of Social Rights, supra note 70, at 653.
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Community-wide employment legislation. 166
C. The Effect of 'Deregulation" in the 1980s
In the mid-1980s, when unemployment was perceived as a major
problem in Europe, employers pressured governments to repeal or
amend statutory requirements involving individual and collective dismis-
sals. 167 Employers sought more flexibility in their use of the
workforce,168 more freedom to hire employees on a temporary or fixed-
term basis, a variety of exemptions from the dismissal laws, and relief
from some of the pretermination requirements under these laws.16 9 Be-
cause the economic restructuring that was occurring was accompanied
by disturbingly high unemployment and difficulty integrating young peo-
ple into the labor market, it seemed necessary from the governments'
point of view to make the labor market more adaptable to changing eco-
nomic conditions.170 The campaign for increased flexibility in the labor
market resulted in some amendments to the protective legislation enacted
since the postwar period. These amendments are one aspect of the dereg-
ulation phenomenon. 17 1
Germany's 1985 Employment Protection Act eased restrictions on
using or renewing temporary contracts by extending, for a limited time,
166. Legislation concerning worker health and safety may be enacted by majority vote.
167. Vranken, Deregulating the Employment Relationship: Current Trends in Europe. 7
CoMP. LAB. L. 143 (1986); Wedderbum, Deregulation and Labour Law in Britain and West-
ern Europe, 6 HOFsTRA LAB. LJ. 135 (1988) [hereinafter Wedderburn, Deregulation].
Unemployment levels rose in many countries in the 1980s and reached particularly high
levels in 1983-85. The official unemployment rate in 1984 was 15% in the UK, 9.7% in
France, and 10.2% in Germany. INT'L LABOR ORG., YEARBOOK OF LABOUR STA rCS 572-
77 (1987).
168. Increasing the flexibility of the labor market has many aspects that are beyond the
scope of this note. In addition to the relaxation of requirements concerning dismissals, em-
ployers sought to modify wage policies, lower the minimum wage for young workers, and ese
constraints on working time and on job duties. See generally LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILrrY:
A COMPARATVE ANTHOLOGY (H. Sarfati & C. Kobrin eds. 1988).
169. Vranken, supra note 167; Mayer, Flexibility of Labor Law. The European Discussion
and the Example of Germany, 29 LEs CAHIERS DE DRorr [C. DE D.] 231 (1988).
170. Not everyone is persuaded that regulation necessarily contributes to high unemploy-
ment or that deregulation improves the situation. Some countries where employment security
is highly regulated, such as Sweden and Austria, have a much lower level of unemployment
than the United Kingdom, which has embarked on a course of deregulation. See Napier, supra
note 71, at 106-07; Lyon-Caen, La Bataille truquie de la flexibilit4 DROrr SOCIAL (No. 12)
801 (1985).
171. The term "deregulation" is somewhat misleading in this context. The employment
relationship is no less regulated than before in the countries discussed; it is just regulated
somewhat differently. It is more accurate to say that the law was structured to foster more
flexibility. Governments took a whole range of affirmative steps to increase flexibility in the
labor market. See Napier, supra note 71, at 102-03.
1991]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
the legally permissible length of temporary contracts from six to eighteen
months. New companies are permitted to use fixed-term contracts of up
to two years.17 2 The 1985 law also exempted new enterprises from cer-
tain obligations in cases of economic dismissals and expanded exemp-
tions for small employers.1 73
Similarly, the French government issued a decree on April 3, 1985,
allowing fixed-term contracts of up to two years. Prior administrative
authorization of economic dismissals was eliminated in 1986.174 Em-
ployee representatives, however, remain specially protected and cannot
be dismissed for any reason without prior authorization. 175 Employers
are still obligated to report dismissals to the Labor Department, to notify
employees in advance and to meet with them before they are termi-
nated.1 76 In cooperation with employee representatives they must plan
and carry out measures to facilitate placement and retraining of the dis-
missed employees and to alleviate hardship.1 77
These amendments do not appear to have changed employment pro-
tection policies fundamentally in France or Germany except to the extent
that they permit more widespread use of atypical employment con-
tracts.1 78 Rather, they reflect an attempt to strike a balance between the
need to adapt to conditions of economic restructuring and the original
protective goals of the legislation. 79 In contrast, changes in the United
Kingdom's labor law in the name of deregulation were far more radical
and extensive, bringing that country into conflict with international stan-
dards and significantly weakening protection against unfair dismissal.' 80
172. Vranken, supra note 167, at 147. These measures were to apply until 1990.
173. Id. at 151; Weiss, Job Security in Germany, supra note 89, at 84.
174. Act of 3 July 1986. See S6guin, Le nouveau Droit des licenciements pour motif
iconomique, Daorr SOCIAL (No. 3) 180 (1987); Ray, Le nouveau Droit du licenclement, DaOIT
SOCIAL (No. 9/10) 664 (1987).
175. Chelle & Pr~tot, Le Champ d'application de I'autorisatlon administrative de licencle-
ment des salarisprot g s, DRorr SOCIAL (No. 9/10) 686 (1987).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Mayer, supra note 169, at 239-45. Since there is a danger that overuse of temporary
and other atypical contracts will lead to a two-tiered labor force, restrictions still exist on the
use of such contracts.
179. The same is true for Italy. Italy extended the use of tripartism and industry-wide
negotiation to find ways to adapt to the economic situation. Wedderburn, Deregulation, supra
note 167, at 143-144.
180. New Employment Bill Seeks to End Protective Legislation, EUR. INDUS. RIZL. R.V.
[EIRR] (No. 180) 9 (1989). Maternity rights, rights to be consulted over redundancy, and
trade union rights were among the rights weakened by the British version of deregulation.
Wedderburn writes that the government "has set about changing the structure and very objec-
tives of traditional labour law .... Virtually a century of measures supportive of collective
bargaining have been repealed" and "the floor of employment protection rights has been signif-
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M. PRETERMINATION MEASURES IN GERMANY,
FRANCE, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
Introduction
The institutions and laws governing employment relations are as im-
portant in determining the actual operation of statutory employment
protection in each country as are the specific provisions of the statutes.
The significant differences in the employment relations systems of
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are beyond the scope of this
Note, but some features that are closely linked to statutory protection
against wrongful termination should be mentioned.
Employee participation in decision-making is most developed in
Germany, more limited in France, and almost nonexistent in the United
Kingdom. In addition to and separate from representation through col-
lective bargaining, employees in Germany have a voice in deciding a wide
range of matters affecting the enterprises in which they work. They par-
ticipate both through the elected works councils and through representa-
tives on supervisory boards."'1 Codetermination in Germany is a central
characteristic of labor law affecting virtually all areas of employment re-
lations, including protection against wrongful termination. 1 2 In France,
employees also participate through elected enterprise committees, but the
scope of participation is more limited."8 3 In the United Kingdom, there
is little institutional support for employee participation outside the tradi-
tional framework of union-management relations.'" And although in
theory the European Community's directives on protecting employee
rights in the event of a change in ownership, insolvency, reorganizations,
and layoffs have been implemented in all three countries, it is doubtful
icantly eroded." Wedderburn, Deregulation, supra note 167, at 146-47; see also Hepple, Sobcal
Rights in the EC supra note 146, at 429-30.
For a discussion of how protection against unfair dismissal has been weakened in the
1980s, see supra text accompanying notes 167-80.
181. See Germany, supra note 98, pt. I, chs. V-VI. Public employees are represented by
staff representation committees similar to the works councils.
After the Second World War, in order to avoid having their industrial empires taken over
by the Allied forces, the owners and managers of several key industries offered workers equal
representation on supervisory boards in exchange for the unions' support. The unions had not
been associated with the Nazi regime, and the strategy succeeded. Codetermination was later
extended to other sectors.
For an interesting comparison between the characteristics of participation in Germany
and the United States, see Summers, German Worker Participation, supra note 68.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 98-103.
183. France, supra note 93, at 195-205.
184. Hepple, Social Rights in the EC, supra note 146, at 429.
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that the United Kingdom has fully implemented -these directives.I85 The
United Kingdom has been especially resistant to developing consultation
with employee representatives before layoffs, even though consultation is
required by one of the directives."8 6
There are also differences in the levels of unionization. In Germany,
approximately forty percent of employees belong to a union.1 87 More
than ninety percent are covered by a collective bargaining agreement,
however, because employers are willing to extend collective agreements
to establishments in which only a minority of employees are union mem-
bers.188 In Germany, as in France, the terms of industry-wide collective
bargaining agreements are sometimes extended beyond the original par-
ties to the agreement, thus bringing more employees within the protec-
tion provided by those agreements. This is not done in the United
Kingdom, 8 9 where the proportion of the workforce that is unionized fell
from fifty-five percent in 1979 to forty percent in 1987.190
France has the lowest level of unionization of all the members of the
European Community.191 For many years union membership fluctuated
between twenty and twenty-five percent of the workforce, but there are
indications that membership has been declining and may now be between
fifteen and eighteen percent. Thus, of the three European countries dis-
cussed here, France is the only one that has roughly the same low level of
unionization as the United States.
Political climate and government policies in each country explain
some features of the statutes and how they are interpreted and applied.
In the United Kingdom, the government's deregulation program of the
1980s has weakened protective legislation on termination of employment
185. Id at 432.
186. Papaioannou, The Duty To Bargain Over Layoffs in Other Western Countries: A View
From an American Perspective, 6 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 241, 259 (1989).
187. Germany, supra note 98, § 262.
188. Summers, German Worker Participation, supra note 68, at 337. In addition, approxi-
mately 80% of employed workers are represented by works councils.
189. Napier, supra note 71, at 110.
190. The reasons for the decline include the decline of the traditional manufacturing sector,
increased opposition to recognizing unions on the part of employers, weakening of trade union
rights and increasingly decentralized bargaining under the Thatcher government, and lack of
interest in unionizing in the developing service sector. Wedderburn, Deregulation, supra note
167, at 141.
191. France, supra note 93, § 333 (citing EUROSTAT, SOCIAL INDICATORS FOR TUE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY (1986)). The figures are estimates, as complete records on union member-
ship are not available.
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introduced in the 1960s and 1970s.192 In contrast, the French govern-
ment in the early 1980s enacted legislation extending employee rights in
the workplace.193 Subsequent revisions by a more conservative govern-
ment did not significantly diminish the statutory protection against
dismissal.194
British labor and employment law differs markedly from the French
and German in that it does not rest on the concept of positive rights.
The right to organize, for example, is based not on a constitutional or
fundamental right of association, but on the idea that trade unions are
immune from laws against the restraint of trade.195 Similarly, British
courts have viewed statutory employment rights, including the right to
be protected against unfair dismissal, as limited exceptions to the princi-
ple of freedom of contract. 96 They have continued to rely on contract-
based common-law principles in adjudicating dismissal cases, and have
tended to interpret narrowly the rights granted by the statute. In this
respect, even though the United Kingdom has enacted legislation against
unfair dismissal, its limited law on wrongful termination resembles cur-
rent United States law with its exceptions to the at-will rule.
The pretermination aspects of statutory employment protection re-
flect these underlying differences between Germany, France, and the
United Kingdom. Nevertheless certain features of the statutory schemes
are common to all three countries. Statutory protection applies to union
as well as to nonunion employees; employee representatives have special
protection; there are threshold requirements and exclusions, for example,
192. Deakin, Equality Under a Market Order: The Employment Act 1989 19 INDs. .J, 1,
14-17 (1990).
The deregulation program has affected both collective and individual labor law. See supra
text accompanying notes 78-180.
193. Glendon, French Labor Law Reform 1982-1983. The Struggle for Collective Bargain-
ing, 32 AM. J. Comy. L. 449 (1984).
194. See Ray, supra note 174, at 664; France: New Law on Redundancies, EIRR (No. 191)
23 (1989); but see Mayer, supra note 169, at 231 (arguing that measures allowing greater use of
temporary and fixed-term contracts may lead to a segmented labor force in France, Germany,
and other countries of Western Europe, with one portion benefitting from employment protec-
tion and another being excluded from statutory protection).
195. Wedderburn, Deregulation, supra note 167, at 142.
196. Id. at 144. Lord Wedderburn summarized this fundamental difference in the role of
legislation in the United Kingdom as compared with Continental civil law countries:
The residual law [the common law], which is waiting for the victims of a statutory
protection denied or removed, does not, like many of its Continental counterparts,
understand the need to protect the employee.... Its concept of freedom of contract
treats the employment contract as just another contract. The recognition of the im-
balance of power behind the employment contract, which is the very basis of modem
labour law systems, is not a factor which fits English doctrine.
Ide at 145.
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of very small establishments. All three countries have a system of labor
courts or tribunals that provide relatively quick adjudication at the first
stage; all have legislation governing dismissals for economic reasons; and
the substantive standard for dismissal is given meaning through case law.
I will turn now to the role of pretermination measures in each of these
countries.
A. Germany
The German dismissal law emphasizes prevention. The statute re-
quires minimum notice, but permits collective bargaining agreements to
vary the statutory period. 197 White-collar workers are entitled to receive
notice at least six weeks before the end of each calendar quarter. 98 The
amount of notice increases with length of service: three months notice
after five years of employment, four months after eight years, five months
after ten years, and six months after twelve years. 199 Agreements can
provide for less notice than the statutory minimum, but notice must be at
least one month.2 °°
The notice requirements for blue-collar workers have traditionally
been shorter. The statutory minimum is two weeks, and is extended to
one month after five years of service, two months after ten years, and
three months after twenty years.2°1 There was also a different method of
calculating years of service for blue-collar workers: only the time worked
after the age of thirty-five was counted. The Constitutional Court, how-
ever, held this dual method of calculating service for blue- and white-
collar workers unconstitutional. 2 2 The more basic question of whether
less favorable notice requirements for blue-collar workers violates equal
treatment principles is currently before the Federal Constitutional
Court.2 °3
Works councils2° play a key role in reviewing all proposed dismis-
sals before they are carried out.20 5  The Works Constitution Act2 6 re-
197. Germany, supra note 98, §§ 171, 175.
198. Id. § 171.
199. d
200. Id.
201. Id. § 172.
202. Decision of 16 Nov. 1982, EzA art. 3, GG No. 13, cited in Weiss, Job Security in
Germany, supra note 89, at 85.
203. Id.
204. Works councils are committees composed of elected employee representatives,
205. Codetermination is a fundamental aspect of German employment relations, Employ-
ees have a voice not only in matters that directly affect them, but also in a fairly wide range of
management decisions. See Summers, German Worker Participation, supra note 68, at 343;
Germany, supra note 98, §§ 350-408.
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quires employers to consult the councils before declaring a dismissal.2
The councils, which in Germany are composed exclusively of elected em-
ployee delegates,2°S have considerable power to prevent an ordinary dis-
missal. An ordinary dismissal is a dismissal for any reason except serious
misconduct.' 9 Only in cases of very serious misconduct is summary dis-
missal allowed. This is known as extraordinary dismissal.210 If the
works council believes an ordinary dismissal is socially unwarranted
under the Protection Against Dismissal Act 211 the council may object to
the dismissal in writing.2 12 For a dismissal to be socially warranted, the
reasons, whether economic or related to the personal characteristics of
the employee, must be objectively substantial and verifiable.
The grounds for objection are specified in the Works Constitution
Act.213 Many of them relate to the employer's legal obligations to ob-
serve certain selection criteria for layoffs. Employers must consider so-
cial aspects of termination such as the employee's age, family
responsibilities, and chances of finding alternative employment. They
have an obligation to investigate the feasibility of placing an employee in
another position within the enterprise. Councils may object to an ordi-
nary dismissal on the grounds that the employer did not sufficiently con-
sider the social aspects, violated a selection guideline, or could transfer
the employee with or without retraining. They may also object on the
ground that the employee is willing to accept a job at lower pay or at a
lower skill level within the enterprise.214
In the case of extraordinary dismissals, the works council has three
days within which it may express reservations in writing.2"' It cannot
prevent such a termination, but its expressed reservations may strengthen
the case of employees who challenge their dismissals in court.216
206. Works Constitution Act of 1972, English translation in Federal Republic of Germany,
in 1 (Legislation) ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 80, at 261 [hereinafter Federal Republic of
Germany].
207. Weiss, Job Security in Germany, supra note 89, at 89.
208. Id. at 83 n.2.
209. Id. at 84-85, 87.
210. The works councils have limited power in the event of an extraordinary or summary
dismissal, which is allowed only "if there are reasons which in view of all circumstances of the
case and in evaluating the interests of both parties make it intolerable for either of the parties
to fulfill the contract until the period of notice." Id. at 84-85.
211. English translation in Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 206, at 229.
212. Id
213. Weiss, Job Security in Germany, supra note 89, at 90.
214. Id at 89-90.
215. Id. at 89.
216. Id. Employees who file a claim with a Labor Court contesting their dismissa cannot,
in most cases, remain on the job until it is resolved. The Federal Labor Court has held that an
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The works council objects on the average to only twenty percent of
ordinary dismissals.217 This figure reflects the predominantly coopera-
tive relations prevailing between management and employees in Ger-
many. The works council has management functions. Its role is to
further the interests of the employees and of the enterprise as a whole,
not to defend every employee. 218  It does not have a duty to represent
each employee as an individual, as unions in the United States must do
when they are the exclusive representative of a group of employees.2 1 9
The works councils therefore exercise their right to object to dismissals
selectively.
Of the dismissals to which the works council formally objects, the
employer goes through with the dismissal in more than sixty percent of
the cases.22° Discharged employees can contest their dismissals in a la-
bor court, and they do so more often when the works council opposes
their dismissals than when it acquiesces or expressly agrees.221
The most important effect of the participation right is preventive. 222
Less than half of all dismissals take place in companies with councils,
even though an estimated sixty percent of the workforce is represented
by a council. 223 The employer's interest in maintaining cooperative rela-
tions with the works council, its copartner in management, provides a
strong incentive to avoid acts that will be perceived as arbitrary.
The German system of pretermination review of individual cases ap-
pears to be effective in discouraging arbitrary terminations in enterprises
which have works councils.224 In addition, the fact that employees also
participate in formulating the selection criteria for layoffs has at least the
potential to discourage arbitrary action in the course of dismissal for eco-
employee has a right to stay on the job while the claim is pending only if a court of first
instance has held that the dismissal was illegal.
The court may award reinstatement, but three to four years generally elapse before an
order to reinstate issues. Perhaps in part for this reason, reintatement orders are rare in
Germany (1.7% of those who initiated a lawsuit according to one empirical study). Another
study conducted in 1978 found that 9% of those who initiate a lawsuit succeed In getting
reinstated. Id at 93-98; Germany, supra note 98, § 197.
In contrast, Swedish law generally allows employees to remain on the job until the claim
is resolved. This usually takes about six months, a far shorter time than in Germany.
217. Weiss, Job Security in Germany, supra note 89, at 95.
218. The functions of unions and works councils are different, though most council dele-
gates are also union members.
219. Summers, German Worker Participation, supra note 68, at 344.
220. Weiss, Job Security in Germany, supra note 89, at 96.
221. Id at 96.
222. Id. at 96-97.
223. Id at 94.
224. Id at 98-99.
[Vol. 14
Employment Termination Reform
nomic reasons, provided the councils exercise this right? Of course,
works councils are not organized in all enterprises, so the protection they
offer is not universal. Many small enterprises do not have councils, so a
minority of private sector employees work in companies where councils
have not been organized. 26
Though effective, this system places less emphasis on the individual
employee's rights than does a unionized environment in the United
States or Britain. The works council does not have a duty equivalent to
an American union's duty of fair representation.2 7 A works council
may act arbitrarily or, given its institutional role, may put the interests of
the enterprise as a whole before the interests of an individual em-
ployee.22s In such cases, the employee's only remaining recourse is to
pursue a claim in the labor courts.
B. The United Kingdom
The substantive standard under the Employment Protection (Con-
solidation) Act (EPCA), as interpreted by the courts and industrial tribu-
nals, is closer to the American good faith standard than to a just cause
standard. 2 9 Unless the dismissal is of a type identified as unfair by defi-
nition, the test used to determine whether dismissal was unfair under the
statute is whether the employer's actions were within the range of reason-
able responses which a reasonable employer might have adopted?3 0 The
tribunals usually uphold a termination if they find that the employer had
a good-faith belief that termination was reasonable. If the employee is
dismissed for misconduct, for example, the employer will prevail if he
can show that he had "a reasonable suspicion amounting to belief in the
guilt of the employee," regardless of whether the employee actually com-
mitted the offense."' Even a dismissal in breach of contract is not neces-
sarily unfair under the statute.2
The tribunals are reluctant to exercise independent judgment on em-
225. The councils do not always exercise their right to influence the selection criteria.
Summers, German Worker Participation, supra note 68, at 348-49.
226. Weiss, Job Security in Germany, supra note 89, at 94. Public sector employees have
participation rights comparable to those of private sector employees. See Germany, supra note
98, §§ 405-408.
227. Summers, German Worker Participation, supra note 68, at 344.
228. Id
229. Great Britain, supra note 80, §§ 272, 309.
230. LORD WEDDERBURN, THnE WoRKER AND THE LAW 244-45 (3d ed. 1986).
231. Edwards, Employment Law Review, 133 Sol. J. 578 (1988) (citing from a recent deci-
sion of the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT), Whitbread & Co. v. Mills, 1988 LR.LIR.
497).
232. Id (citing Hooper v. British Railways Bd., 1988 I.L.R.L 517).
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ployers' decisions.233 In one case, a sales representative was fired when
she married a man who worked for a competing firm. The industrial
tribunal held her dismissal was not unfair, stating: "It is common sense
that the loyalties of the applicant ... would cash at times. The old
adage that you cannot work for two masters applies in this case."'234
The deferential standard used to evaluate whether an employer's de-
cision to dismiss is reasonable undermines the effectiveness of the legisla-
tion. Not surprisingly, employees prevail in only one-third of
complaints.23 5 Even more significantly, relatively few employees bring
claims under the statute.236 Threshold qualifications leave many employ-
ees completely outside the scope of the EPCA. An increasing proportion
of employees are not covered because they have worked for their em-
ployer for less than two years, are in an "atypical" employment situation
such as a part-time or on-call arrangement, or they were involved in a
constructive discharge.
The remedies under the statute are quite limited. Even though rein-
statement was made the primary remedy in 1975, reinstatement awards
remain extremely rare.237 In keeping with their generally deferential ap-
proach to what they regard as management prerogatives, the industrial
tribunals have tended to find that reinstatement is not practicable when-
ever the employer opposes it.238  Compensation, the remedy in most
cases, is low. The median award in 1983 represented nine weeks of aver-
age earnings, 239 and in cases that settled without a hearing the average
payment was only forty percent of the typical tribunal award.240 These
233. Great Britain, supra note 80, § 309.
234. Kelly, A Comparative Analysis of the Termination-At-Rill Doctrine, 7 ARIZ. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 105, 130 (1989) (quoting from The Times (London), Aug. 21, 1985, at 3, col, I).
The author of this article is of the opinion that the British system works relatively well.
235. Great Britain, supra note 80, § 272.
236. Id § 271.
237. Reinstatement was made the primary remedy in response to criticisms about the rarity
of reinstatement orders. 0. Kahn-Freund described the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 as "a
very diluted version of the German legislation." 0. KAHN-FREUND, On Uses and Misuses of
Comparative Law, in SELECTED WrrNGs 315 (1978). He described the failure to provide
enforceable reinstatement as a critical weakness of the 1971 Act and one of the failings which
made it weaker than both the German law and United States labor law. Id.; see also T. HO.
NORt, supra note 75, at 31-33 (1982).
Despite the fact that the statute makes reinstatement the primary remedy, reinstatement
or reengagement are ordered in under 5% of the awards. L. DIC(KENS, supra note 63, at 107-
11. Reengagement means the employee is given a job with the same employer, but the employ-
ment contract is a new one. An employee who is reengaged rather than reinstated may lose
seniority and consequently become more vulnerable to subsequent layoffs.
238. See L. DicKENs, supra note 63, at 11; Great Britain, supra note 80, § 273.




remedies probably do little to deter arbitrary terminations. The statute,
in short, as it is interpreted and enforced, provides modest compensation
for some employees, but little protection against unfair termination.241
While deferential to employers' reasons for termination, the EPCA
requires employers to give notice: one week to a person employed be-
tween four weeks and two years, one week for each year of continuous
employment to a person continuously employed for between two and
twelve years, and twelve weeks for a person continuously employed
twelve years or more.242 A dismissal in violation of statutory notice re-
quirements will not necessarily be found unfair under the statute, though
it may be wrongful at common law.243 Summary dismissal, or dismissal
without notice, is allowed only under certain circumstances. In deciding
whether summary dismissal was appropriate, the courts consider factors
developed under the common law such as whether an important term of
the contract has been broken, whether the employee's actions have un-
dermined mutual confidence, and whether the employee has a reasonable
excuse for the act that provoked the dismissal.2"
The EPCA does not directly require pretermination review of dis-
missals, but it does require employers of twenty or more employees to
inform their employees, in writing, of any disciplinary rules and proce-
dures applicable to them.245 One of the goals of the first unfair dismissal
statute, the Industrial Relations Act of 1971, was to encourage employ-
ers voluntarily to adopt principles of progressive discipline and internal
grievance procedures. The legislators anticipated that employers and un-
ions would negotiate the content of such procedures.2' The 1971 Act
included a provision allowing an industry to be exempt from the statute
if it developed internal grievance procedures. To qualify for the exemp-
tion, a grievance procedure had to provide an independent appeal stage
241. Business International reported on October 1, 1989: "The UK now imposes few offi-
cial constraints on companies' abilities to hire and fire, and is resisting pressure from the EC
for tighter regulation in this area. But compensation often must be paid." Bus. INT'L, Oct. 1,
1989.
242. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, § 49; Great Britain, supra note 80,
§ 292.
243. Kelly, supra note 234, at 121 n.127 (citing BSC Sports and Social Club v. Morgan,
1987 I.R.L.R. 391). A cause of action for wrongful termination may still exist at common law,
when, for example, the employee, the employer, or the employment is not covered by the
statute.
244. Great Britain, supra note 80, § 294.
245. The Employment Act of 1989 eliminated this requirement for firms employing fewer
than 20 employees. Deakin, supra note 192, at 14.
246. L. DiCKENs, supra note 63, at 237.
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and remedies comparable to those available under the statute.247
Very few enterprises have made use of this exemption. 248 Nonethe-
less, the legislation has clearly encouraged the adoption of internal disci-
plinary procedures.2 9 A study conducted in 1980 found that eighty-
three percent of a sampling of two thousand establishments employing at
least twenty-five workers had formal dismissal procedures. In most cases
the procedures were less than ten years old.250
Few of these voluntary procedures qualify for the exemption, how-
ever.251 In contrast to Germany and to enterprises with collective bar-
gaining in the United States, shop floor rules and grievance procedures
are not negotiated but are written by management without consulting the
employees. These procedures usually do not provide for an appeal before
a neutral party.252
As the EPCA has been interpreted, an employer's failure to follow
its own procedures under personnel policies does not necessarily make a
dismissal unfair.253 The "range of reasonable employer responses" test
has been accompanied by a weak procedural, as well as substantive, stan-
dard. The tribunals have adopted a sliding scale approach to employer
breaches of procedural requirements: when the tribunal finds that the
employer probably would have dismissed the employee even if the em-
ployer had observed the proper procedures, failure to observe the proce-
dures does not make the dismissal unfair.254 The assumption underlying
this approach is that the only purpose of the procedures is to ensure the
correctness of the employer's decision.255 It ignores the value of appro-
priate procedures in encouraging fair and dignified treatment of
employees.
The EPCA gives covered employees the right to receive a statement
of reasons for their dismissal. The Employment Act of 1989 increased
the qualifying period for this right from six months to two years. 216 This
amendment made the qualifying period for the right to a statement of
reasons the same as the qualifying period to bring a claim for unfair dis-
247. Id at 238.
248. .kd; Great Britain, supra note 80, § 274.
249. L. DICKENS, supra note 63, at 232-33.
250. Id at 234-35.
251. Id at 238.
252. Id
253. Edwards, supra note 231, at 578; Deakin, supra note 192, at 14-15.
254. Collins, Unfair Dismissal. Procedural Fairness after Polkey, 19 INDUS. L.J. 39, 40-43
(1990).
255. Id. at 42-43.
256. Deakin, supra note 192, at 14.
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missal, which was increased to two years in 1985.257 Like the tribunals'
narrow view of the reasons for procedural protections, this change by the
legislature ignores the value of a statement of reasons to the employee. A
statement of reasons may be of value to a probationary employee, or to
an employee who suspects that discrimination motivated the discharge,
even though the employee does not meet the two year threshold require-
ment for an unfair dismissal claim 58
Because many employees are not eligible under the statute or cannot
obtain relief under it for other reasons, they have sought relief in the
courts under common-law theories. Though for the most part both the
tribunals and the reviewing courts have given a very restrictive interpre-
tation of employees' rights under the statute, some courts have been will-
ing to expand the remedies available to dismissed employees on a variety
of common-law theories.2 5 9 A common thread in these decisions is the
courts' willingness to enforce any procedural rights to which the em-
ployee is entitled, including any contractual or statutory rights to a
pretermination investigation or hearing. At the same time, the courts are
understandably vague about what substantive rights are implicated.21°
In one line of cases, the courts have issued a temporary injunction to
bar termination until the employer has complied with the procedures re-
quired by contract or by personnel policies.26' The courts have granted
this relief only when they have found that there is continued confidence
between employer and employee.262 Another line of cases allows a tem-
porary injunction to issue to prevent a breach of contract by dismissal.263
A third implies principles of "natural justice," or a duty to treat the em-
ployee fairly,2 into the contracts of "status" employees, primarily pub-
lie sector employees with job tenure.265
It appears that the courts may at some point be willing to imply
natural justice on the basis of statutory rights.266 Implicit in the deci-
257. Id
258. See idL at 15.
259. See, ,g., Carty, supra note 71, at 449-50; Pitt, Dismissal at Common Law: The Rele-
vance in Britain of American Developments 52 MOD. L. REv. 22, 38 (1988); Napier, supra
note 71, at 108-10.
260. Carty, supra note 71, at 468.
261. Id at 459.
262. Continued confidence means that the employer believes that the employee is capable
and willing to do the job, the employee wants to continue working, and relations between them
are not irremediably damaged. -
263. Carty, supra note 71, at 465; Napier, supra note 71, at 109.
264. The concept is somewhat analogous to notions of due process.
265. Carty, supra note 71, at 465.
266. Ard at 461-62.
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sions enforcing procedural rights is the assumption that the employee
can be legally dismissed once the correct procedures are implemented.
At least one observer believes, however, that unacknowledged substan-
tive rights are "lurking behind such procedural rights."267
Those dissatisfied with the level of protection in Britain have wel-
comed these common law developments.26 ' There seems to be a lesson
here, however, for the United States. Especially in a common-law sys-
tem, ineffective statutory protection could lead to renewed litigation to
resolve termination complaints. Of course, the Uniform Act proposed by
the drafting committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws preempts common-law causes of action arising out
of a termination,269 but this provision would not necessarily rule out judi-
cial intervention to prevent a wrongful discharge. Ideally, a statute
should be effective and comprehensive enough to make this kind of inter-
vention unnecessary.
The British legislation is ineffective primarily because the courts and
tribunals have not read the statute as creating an affirmative right to fair
treatment, or as establishing an objective standard for termination. Be-
cause of the way the unfair dismissal statute has been interpreted and
applied, it does not really break with the legal tradition that purports to
treat employment contracts like any other contract. It only creates a
limited statutory exception to the employer's right to terminate.
C. France
As in Germany and Britain, French employment protection statutes
require minimum notice. Custom and collective bargaining agreements
can provide for longer notice.270 An employee who has worked for six
continuous months is entitled to one month's notice; after two years the
minimum notice period is two months. In addition to these statutory
provisions, custom allows an employee up to two hours a day to look for
a new job during the notice period.2 71
A dismissal is wrongful under the statute if it is not for a genuine
and serious reason. The labor tribunals27 2 and the reviewing courts have
267. Id. at 468.
268. See id. at 464-68; Pitt, supra note 259, at 38-39.
269. Uniform Act, supra note 2, § 3(c).
270. France, supra note 93, § 234.
271. Id
272. Labor tribunals, called Conseils des Prud'hommes, arc composed of lay persons of
various occupations elected by employers and employees to serve as judges of labor disputes,
See id. §§ 298-299.
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interpreted "genuine" in a manner that is fairly deferential to managerial
judgment, but "serious" has been interpreted to mean that employers'
actions must be evaluated in light of principles of progressive disci-
pline.2 73 In an effort to achieve consistency, the courts have ranked of-
fenses into four categories. A slight offense does not justify dismissal,
whereas if the offense is very serious, the employee forfeits the right to
notice and to severance pay. In between these extremes fall offenses that
may be serious enough to justify dismissal but not forfeiture of the right
to notice and severance pay. Incompetence, offensive behavior by a man-
ager towards his subordinates which included deliberate name calling,
and reorganization of the company have been held to constitute genuine
and serious cause.274
Safeguards are based both on employee participation through the
French version of works councils, called enterprise committees,27 and
on statutory procedures. The statutory procedures, which are spelled
out in detail, provide the primary checks on individual terminations,
whereas employee consultation plays an increasingly important role in
collective terminations for economic reasons.
An employee who has at least a year's tenure on the job has a right
to an informal meeting with the employer before formal notice is
given. 27 6 The pretermination meeting is intended to give the employee
an opportunity to hear the employer's reasons for the termination and to
respond to any accusations; it is also intended to give the employer a
chance to reconsider.27 7 A qualified employee has a right to this meeting
regardless of the reason for the proposed termination. Like the
pretermination hearing required under Loudermil12 71 in U.S. case law, it
is not a full evidentiary hearing. The employee may be represented at
this meeting by a person chosen from a list drawn up by a government
agency on the advice of unions and employer organizations. 279
If the employer maintains the decision to terminate, he is required to
273. Id. §§ 241-242.
274. Id. §§ 242-243.
275. Enterprise committees are mandatory for enterprises with more than 50 employees.
The lack of a structure for representation in small and medium-sized enterprises is a problem.
Id. § 237.
276. Since 1982, similar requirements apply to disciplinary action as well as to discharge.
Employees have the right to notice, to have an opportunity to respond, and have the right to
have a coworker present at a meeting which must be held before sanctions can be imposed.
Glendon, supra note 193, at 455.
277. France, supra note 93, § 229. Observers report that employers rarely change their
decision as a result of this pretermination meeting.
278. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1984).
279. France: New Law on Redundancies, EIRR (No. 191) 23-25 (1989).
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state the reasons for the dismissal in writing if the employee so re-
quests.28 ° The statement of reasons is provided separately from the no-
tice of termination because employees feared that if employers were
required to include the reasons when giving notice, the notice letter could
become a handicap to finding new employment.2"
Covered employees282 who are dismissed without real and serious
cause and who are not reinstated are entitled to an award of not less than
six months wages, regardless of actual damages.283 Although adminis-
trative pre-authorization for economic dismissals was eliminated in
1987,2" employers must still comply with certain requirements before
dismissing employees for economic reasons. In addition to following the
provisions applicable to individual terminations, employers with at least
fifty employees must consult with the enterprise committees on a regular
basis concerning projected employment levels. As in Germany, employ-
ers are required to work with the enterprise committees to develop a so-
cial plan. The purposes of a social plan are to prevent layoffs to the
extent possible by retraining and transferring employees, and to ease the
effects of unavoidable layoffs.28 5
Employers planning to dismiss ten or more employees must meet
with the enterprise committee before notifying the affected individuals.28 6
And, while employers were already required to consult the committee
before defining selection criteria for economic dismissals, a 1989 amend-
ment specifies certain criteria employers must take into account. These
criteria include: family responsibilities, especially in one-parent families;
length of service with the company; and the situation of employees likely
280. France, supra note 93, § 231.
281. In the past, French workers were required to show prospective employers a worker
passport, called a livret d'ouvrier, in which successive employers indicated whether the em-
ployee had left in good standing. This practice, designed to make it easy for employers to
screen out troublemakers, essentially gave employers the power to blacklist workers. See M.
PERROT, LEs OUVRIERS EN GRAVE (1871-1890) (1974). Current law requires employers to
give employees a certificate free of any stigmatizing information when the employment rela-
tionship terminates. France, supra note 93, § 262.
282. Threshold qualifications are one year of service for an employer employing more than
ten employees. Employees not meeting these threshold qualifications may still recover for
damages actually suffered. Moreover, the requirement of a pretermination meeting applies to
all employers and employees, regardless of whether they meet the threshold requirements ap-
plicable to other provisions. Ray, supra note 174, at 665.
283. France, supra note 93, § 260.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 174-75; S6guin, supra note 174. Although some
unions opposed this change, it is not as significant as it might seem because 87% of requests
were eventually granted. Id.




to face particular difficulties finding another job, especially handicapped
and older workers." 7 These provisions are similar to the requirement
under German law to consider social aspects in selecting workers for
dismissal.
The line between substantive and procedural rights in France is
more clearly drawn than in the United Kingdom. Whether an employer
failed to follow the required procedures is a separate inquiry from
whether the employer had legally sufficient cause to dismiss, and each
has different consequences. Failure to follow the proper procedure does
not, by itself, make a dismissal void, but may result in a separate penalty
if the dismissal is also without genuine and serious cause.238 An em-
ployer who does not follow the required procedures may have to go
through the process correctly and pay compensation. 28 9 This logical but
rather impractical remedy2m is similar to the remedy granted under U.S.
case law when a public employee is deprived of pretermination proce-
dures required by statute or by contract, but does not have a "property
interest" in the job.291
A discriminatory firing, in contrast, may be declared void. Since
1985, legislation allows the tribunals to declare void a termination for
reasons of sex, race, national origin, family status, ethnicity, political
opinions, union activities, or religious convictions.292 When a termina-
tion is declared void, the employment relationship is deemed not to have
been severed by the purported termination. Special protections apply to
employee representatives. They were one of the first categories of em-
ployees the courts were willing to reinstate, beginning in 1974.293 Prior
permission from the Labor Inspectorate is required before an employer
287. Loi 89-549 du 2 aofit 1989 modifiant le code du travail et relative Ii la prevention du
licenciement 6conomique (Law 89-549 of Aug. 2, 1987, modifying the employment code and
relative to the prevention of economic dismissals) (J.0. Aug. 8, 1989), 109 GAZETrE DU PA-
LAiS 420 (1989).
288. France, supra note 93, §§ 252-253.
289. Id
290. This penalty makes sense in theory but may be ineffectual and even ridiculous if the
dismissal is allowed to take effect before the penalty is imposed. Since the dismissal claim
takes, on the average, 11 months to resolve before the conseils de prud'hommes (labor tribu-
nals), a plaintiff may be in the position of having to request time off from a new job in order to
attend the so-called pretermination meeting that the employee was legally entitled to before
being fired from his or her former job. Ray, supra note 174, at 666 n.16.
291. Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543 (9th Cir. 1988); Dorr v. County of Butte, 795 F.2d
875 (9th Cir. 1986).
292. Ray, supra note 174, at 667.
293. IL The reinstatement remedy was later extended to other types of discriminatory
firings, and then to ordinary employees under particular circumstances.
Reinstatement was ordered in a recent case involving the employee's right of expression,
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may terminate an employee representative, whether for disciplinary or
for economic reasons.294 The recent trend in France is to strengthen
these protections by treating illegal terminations of employee representa-
tives as void.295
The role of employee participation in France seems to be growing
with respect to economic dismissals, but it is not as important to
noneconomic individual dismissals. In such individual cases, safeguards
are based more on statutory procedures than on employee participation.
The statutory notice and pretermination requirements are the opera-
tional safeguards against arbitrary or erroneous discharges. Although
the informal pretermination meeting is a much more summary procedure
than review by the works councils under the German system, and may
not persuade employers to reverse a decision very often, it does en-
courage employers to think twice. As the severance pay and penalties
under the statute are considerably higher than in the United Kingdom,
thinking twice may help to deter wrongful termination.
D. Lessons for the United States
A clear lesson of comparing the German, French, and British exper-
iences with statutory protection against wrongful termination is that
such protection is not an obstacle to efficiency or to a prosperous econ-
omy. Of the three countries discussed in this Note, Germany has the
strongest employment security measures and the highest level of em-
ployee participation. Labor relations are highly regulated, yet the labor
market seems to adapt relatively well to technological and structural
and commentators predict that the courts will extend the remedy to employees not in specially
protected categories. Id.
294. Chelle & Pr6tot, supra note 175, at 687.
The majority of requests to terminate employee representatives are granted at the first
level, the Labor Inspector (approximately 72% in 1985, 78% in 1986, and 84% in 1987).
However, of the decisions appealed in those years, termination was approved in 44%, 40%,
and 48% of cases, respectively.
Economic reasons were given for approximately 85% of requests to terminate employee
representatives in the years 1985-87. Labor inspectors approved 75 to 86% of terminations
requested for economic reasons, as opposed to 52 to 66% for other reasons. On appeal, how-
ever, the proportion of terminations for noneconomic motives which were approved was
greater than the proportion of terminations for economic motive,. Ministete du Travail, Serv-
ices des Etudes et de la Statistique, Les licenciements des reprdsenlants du personnel en 1985,
1986 et 1987, DOSSIERS STATISTIQUES Du TRAVAIL ET DE L'EMPLOI (No. 45) 105, 107
(1988).
295. Chelle & Pr6tot, supra note 175, at 687-88. Significantly, although the 1986 amend-
ments to French dismissal legislation eliminated prior administrative authorization for group
layoffs, similar pretermination safeguards for employee representatives were strengthened.
Ray, supra note 174, at 670.
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change.296 Employers cannot dismiss an employee without first consult-
ing the works council, yet this has not prevented Germany from
prospering.
Perhaps this is because German labor law actually contributes to
flexibility by simultaneously defining the rights and obligations of the two
sides, and allowing the parties to resolve conflicts informally on that ba-
sis."' The German constitutional approach to employment rights con-
trasts strikingly with British law, which does not view employment
regulation as guaranteeing important, substantive rights. If employment
protection legislation is enacted in the United States, it should acknowl-
edge that the interest in retaining one's job is an important one, even if in
the private sector it is not viewed as a constitutionally protected property
right.
The substantive standard for dismissal is the heart of employment
termination legislation. In the United States, a political battle over the
substantive standard for dismissal in proposed legislation continues, even
though most academic commentators agree that a just cause standard is
the best solution.298 This standard is flexible, and it balances the legiti-
mate interests of employers and employees. The Uniform Act proposed
a good cause standard, with comments emphasizing that good cause en-
compasses "management's right to make legitimate business decisions
and react to changing economic conditions."29 9 Employer representa-
tives continue nonetheless to urge the drafting committee to adopt a
"good-faith-business-judgment" standard.3"
A good-faith-business-judgment standard would legitimize existing
practices rather than set a new standard requiring an objectively valid
reason for dismissal. A statute can only protect employees' interests if it
requires a good reason for terminating an employee. The British experi-
ence demonstrates that a standard that merely reflects existing norms
affords little protection to employees. There are many reasons why statu-
tory protection in Britain is ineffective, but one of the most important is
that the British system does not set an objective standard for dismissal.
Instead, it allows existing practices to define the standard. The substan-
tive standards of the French and German systems are more meaningful;
the real and serious reason standard of the French legislation is compara-
296. Streeck, Book Review, 11 COMP. LAB. L. 249, 253 (1990) (reviewing K. WILUAMS,
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE GERMAN MODEL (1988)).
297. Id
298. See sources cited supra note 6, particularly Grodin, supra note 6, at 145 n.55.
299. Uniform Act, supra note 2, at 24.
300. Uniform Employment-Termination Act Drafting Continues, supra note 49, at 1.
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ble to a just cause standard, and the German socially warranted standard
is even more protective of the employee's interest in job security.
The British experience also suggests that if people are dissatisfied
with the protection afforded by a statute that is supposed to protect em-
ployees against wrongful termination, employees will turn to the courts
for relief. When this happens, the statute will have failed to achieve one
of its main purposes: to resolve termination disputes by more appropriate
means than litigation.
The absence of any mandatory pretermination safeguards other than
notice adds to the deficiencies of the British system. Dismissal legislation
has encouraged private sector employers to adopt their own voluntary
disciplinary procedures, but even these procedures generally do not give
rise to enforceable rights. In contrast, the German and the French legis-
lation provide for mandatory pretermination review. The German form
of review is clearly not transferable to the United States in the short
term, however, because it is inseparable from the German system of co-
operative labor relations and employee participation in decision-making.
In fact, the German model of employment relations, which allows em-
ployees a major role in decision-making, is not considered transferable
even to other member countries of the European Community at this
time.3"' If new forms of employee participation develop significantly in
the United States, however, some features of the German model might
become more accessible.30 2
The French system contains some features that would contribute to
making employment termination legislation effective, and which are at
the same time more easily transferable to the United States. The French
employment protection statutes are designed to operate with or without a
union presence. In France when there is a union presence, union-man-
agement relations are usually adversarial, as they are in the United
States. Consultation with enterprise committees, a less adversarial ar-
rangement, is a central feature of the provisions governing dismissals for
economic reasons, but does not play an important role in monitoring in-
dividual dismissals for other reasons. The notice and pretermination
meeting required by French law are not onerous procedures. They do
not require fundamental changes in workplace relations, but they help
301. Treu, supra note 164, at 447.
302. A recent report by the National Association of Manufacturers forecasts rapid cvolu-
tion of employee participation. NAM Report: America's Workforce in the 1990s, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at A-20 (Mar. 15, 1990). See also Workeis Happy to be In Charge, San
Francisco Exam., Dec. 2, 1990, at D1, col. 1.
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protect important employee interests. A statute for the United States
should include similar provisions.
Adoption of legislation in the United States such as the Uniform
Act, provided it establishes a just cause standard, would be a limited but
desirable step that is long overdue and may be within reach. While em-
ployment relationships must be ended frequently for legitimate reasons,
the law should require an objectively verifiable and sufficient reason, no-
tice, an explanation, and a chance for the parties to avoid a termination
that may be wrongful or unnecessary. The Act could be strengthened by
adding pretermination requirements similar to those in the French
legislation.
IV. WHAT SHOULD A STATUTE REQUIRE BEFORE
TERMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES?
In a recent article, Professor West proposed a model of wrongful
termination legislation based on the principles of due process that now
apply only to public sector employment in the United States. 3  She sug-
gested that employees' interests in job security could be protected most
effectively by making a pretermination hearing available. The most
meaningful time for a hearing, she argues, is before termination takes
effect;a° it should be similar to the pretermination hearing required for
public employees under Loudermill.0 5 The hearing could be conducted
by a new or an existing administrative agency, such as the agency that
now administers unemployment insurance."a 6
Interestingly, management-side representatives have recently asked
the drafting committee for the Uniform Termination of Employment Act
to add a provision that would allow employers to request a pretermina-
tion hearing to determine whether there is good cause to dismiss under
the Uniform Act.30 7 The provision would enable employers to avoid or
to limit their liability. A growing proportion of nonunion private sector
employers have adopted internal procedures designed to ensure fair and
consistent treatment of employees when making decisions about disci-
pline and discharge.30 8 Clearly, many employers feel it is in their own
303. West, supra note 63.
304. I at 60.
305. Id at 59-60.
306. IM at 60-61 (proposing a newly created agency); Bellace, Employment Protection in
the EEC, 20 STAN. J. INT'L L. 413, 424-26 (1984) (proposing use of existing agency such as
unemployment insurance department).
307. Termination Act Drafters Refine Policy Terminations, supra note 49, at 1.
308. D.W. EWING, JUSTICE ON THE JoH: RESOLVING GIEvANCES IN THE NONUNION
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interest to have a procedure for determining whether a dismissal is justi-
fied before carrying it out, preferably one which is viewed as fair by
employees.
In terms of protecting the employees' interests in retaining their
jobs, the most meaningful time for a hearing is indeed before termination
takes effect. If posttermination hearings take place more than a few
months after dismissal, and if reinstatement is not feasible, a pretermina-
tion hearing is likely to be of more value to the employee. Reinstatement
may well be impractical in many cases; in the countries discussed in this
Note, reinstatement is rarely awarded.309 The same pattern is found in
other European countries.31
Making a pretermination hearing available would acknowledge the
importance of the interest at stake for the employee. Private sector em-
ployees' interests in retaining their jobs are as great as that of public
employees. In terms of the interest protected, it is appropriate to extend
principles of due process to the private sector employment relationship.
Some employers have already adopted internal rules based on those prin-
ciples in the belief that this approach benefits both employees and em-
ployers. 31 1 Notice, an explanation, and an opportunity to respond before
adverse action is taken, all fundamental to due process, acknowledge an
employee's dignity and autonomy. Moreover, providing an explanation
and time for adjustment might also help to alleviate the emotional dis-
tress associated with a termination. This type of injury would no longer
be compensable under the Uniform Act.31 2 Time off to look for work
during the notice period, granted to employees in France and Germany,
would be helpful both on a practical and on a psychological level.
The French experience with statutory employment protection dem-
onstrates that mandatory notice, an informal pretermination meeting,
and an explanation are not unreasonably burdensome requirements. To
the extent that these measures help to reduce litigation arising out of
discharges, the effort involved would be well spent. These measures can
WORKPLACE 3 (1989). The author of this study found that a minority of corporations now
have grievance procedures based on principles of due process, but that this practice is growing
"by leaps and bounds." Id. Another study by A.F. WEsrIN & A.G. FELIU, RESOLVING
EMPLOYMENT DisPUTEs WrrHouT LmGATION 4-15 (1988), also found that use of formal
grievance procedures is increasing among nonunion employers.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 181-302.
310. Sherman, supra note 63, at 467; Estreicher, supra note 63, at 310.
311. D.W. Ewing calls this phenomenon "corporate due process." D.W. EWING, supra
note 308, at 4-6.
312. Uniform Act, supra note 2, § 3(c).
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operate without union participation, but unions may take advantage of
the opportunity to advise nonmembers involved in the process.
How effective these modest pretermination measures are is difficult
to assess. The pretermination meeting required by the French statute is
very informal and does not involve a neutral arbiter. An informal meet-
ing has several advantages: it is easy to arrange, involves virtually no
expense, and gives the parties a chance to to talk in a setting that may be
more conducive to compromise than one that is more formal.
The informal meeting may be less effective as a safeguard, however,
than a hearing run by a neutral arbiter. Having a neutral arbiter preside
over a pretermination hearing would demand more time and preparation,
but may offer the employee a more meaningful opportunity to be heard.
For this reason, and because the parties may examine the facts more
closely in a hearing before a neutral third party, this type of hearing may
prove more effective in achieving early resolution of disputes. If this ap-
proach reduces the need for posttermination hearings and remedies, the
additional resources it requires would be well spent. Experience may be
the best guide to determining which is the better model: the minimal
informal meeting as required by the French legislation or a hearing
before a neutral arbiter. Both models deserve consideration. The Uni-
form Act should provide for at least one type of pretermination hearing;
perhaps the two models should be presented as alternatives to allow
experimentation.
Notice is another component of pretermination protection. France,
Germany, and Britain all require notice, or pay in lieu of notice, subject
to certain exceptions. In those countries, notice provisions apply to ter-
mination for both individual and economic reasons. The Uniform Act is
silent on the question of notice,313 but notice is an important component
of employment protection and should be required.
Exceptions from notice requirements are appropriate when the em-
ployment must be terminated because of an unforeseen emergency such
as a natural disaster,314 or when the employee's behavior threatens the
health, safety, or well-being of others. As the U.S. Supreme Court sug-
gested in Loudermill, suspension may be the appropriate way to deal
with such situations until the issue of dismissal is settled.
The best way to incorporate a notice requirement would be for the
Uniform Act to set a minimum notice period, such as thirty days, while
313. Id
314. The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988 (WARN), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2101-2109 (Supp. 1990), requires notice of mass layoffs and contains exceptions for natural
disasters and unforeseeable business circumstances, id § 2102(b).
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permitting express agreements providing for longer notice. The mini-
mum notice should increase with length of service. A pretermination
hearing, if requested, would be held within the notice period. A written
statement of reasons, which the Uniform Act does require, would be
most useful to the employee when notice is given.
If an employer failed to comply with these pretermination proce-
dures, the four possible consequences are the following: to treat the ter-
mination as void; to treat it as wrongful per se; to make the employer go
back and follow the correct procedures; and to order compensation. The
first two options seem inconsistent with the requirement of just cause:
whether the employer has good cause to dismiss and whether the proper
procedures were followed should be distinct questions. An employer's
failure to observe required procedures, however, may be relevant to the
just cause determination. Requiring the employer to follow the correct
procedure is the logical remedy, and has been used in the United States
in public sector employment cases, 315 as well as in France. When con-
ducting the procedure is not feasible or would not be helpful to the em-
316ployee, however, compensation should be awarded instead, as part of,
or in addition to, any severance payment.
Selection criteria for layoffs is an aspect of pretermination protection
that the Uniform Act addresses only by providing that a good faith man-
agement judgment as to the legitimate economic needs of the employer
constitutes good cause for termination. 3 7 This language suggests that a
discharge for improper reasons, deliberately disguised as a layoff, would
be wrongful under the Act. The comment to this provision explains fur-
ther that even though layoffs may be economically justified, "an individ-
ual may still contest his or her selection for layoff on the grounds it was
discriminatory or otherwise without good cause.' 318 The Act's language
assumes, however, that the employer is the sole judge of selection criteria
and does not suggest any substantive or procedural guidelines for deter-
mining those criteria.
The Recommendations accompanying the 1982 ILO Convention
suggest that the interests of employees as well as the needs of the em-
ployer should be taken into account, and that selection criteria should be
315. See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of U.S. cases involving
constitutional due process for public employees.
316. For example, when the employee has found other employment by the time the dis-
pute is heard. This problem has arisen in France. Ray, supra note 174.
317. Uniform Act, supra note 2, § 1(4).
318. Id § 1(4) comment.
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determined in advance whenever possible.31 9 In accord with these guide-
lines, French and German law require employers to consider the unequal
impact of termination on differently situated employees in establishing
selection criteria for economic dismissals.
Such practices would discourage the use of arbitrary and discrimina-
tory selection criteria, and thereby prevent wrongful discharges in the
context of layoffs. In the United States, the Worker Adjustment and Re-
training Notification Act (WARN), 320 which took effect in 1989, requires
employers with one hundred or more employees to give sixty days notice
of shutdowns and layoffs of large numbers of workers.321 At least twelve
states have enacted legislation requiring notice to employees in case of
layoffs, shutdowns, or relocations.32 None of the plant closure statutes
have yet addressed the problem of selection criteria. Though it may be
more appropriate to address this aspect of termination in the context of
plant closure legislation, protection against wrongful termination would
be improved by developing guidelines for selection criteria. The Uniform
Act could also encourage, if not require, the practice of allowing employ-
ees time off to look for another job during the notice period. Both types
of measures are in accord with the 1982 ILO Recommendations as well
as with French and German law and custom.
These proposed additions to the Uniform Act are certain to be con-
troversial, but they would also contribute to more effective protection of
employees' interests. As some employers have already concluded,
pretermination review has advantages-for employers as well as for em-
ployees. The procedures those employers are already using could be
adapted to satisfy the proposed pretermination requirements.
V. CONCLUSION
At present it is unclear whether the Uniform Act on Employment
Termination will be enacted after it emerges from the unavoidable pro-
319. The 1982 Recommendation, 166 adopted June 22, 1982, provides:
Criteria for Selection for Termination
23. (1) The selection by the employer of workers whose employment is to be
terminated for reasons of an economic, technological, structural or similar nature
should be made according to criteria, established whenever possible in advance,
which give due weight both to the interests of the undertaking, establishment or
service and to the interests of the workers.
1982 Recommendation, supra note 142, § 23.
320. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (Supp. 1990).
321. Id §§ 2101-2102.
322. For a review of state legislation on plant closings and relocations, see 507 Individual
Empl. Rts. Man. (BNA) 104 (1991).
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cess of political compromise. Legislation based on a just cause standard
would provide needed protection to private sector employees, particu-
larly to those with low earnings. Advantages to employers include
greater certainty, less exposure to liability, limited damages, and a less
expensive, more expeditious means of resolving termination disputes.
Both employers and employees benefit from the improved morale that
comes when people feel they are treated with respect.
Because employees' interest in retaining their jobs is an important
one, it is appropriate to extend the principles of due process to the private
sector employment relationship. Labor arbitrators in the United States
have done this for a long time. Due process in the labor arbitration con-
text requires that rules be both reasonable and reasonably enforced, and
relies on principles of progressive discipline.32 3 Similar principles are ex-
pressed in the 1982 ILO Convention. Notice, an explanation of reasons,
an opportunity to respond before adverse action is taken, and the right to
appeal before a neutral body are the essential components of due process
in this context. These measures are important not only in preventing
erroneous decisions, but also in treating employees with dignity, whether
or not dismissal is warranted. An opportunity to contest a dismissal
before termination is more meaningful to the employee both in a practi-
cal and in a psychological sense. Statutory protection against wrongful
termination will be more effective if it provides pretermination safe-
guards: notice, an explanation of reasons, and an opportunity to review a
proposed dismissal before it is carried out.
323. See McPherson, supra note 2, at 390.
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